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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
It’s a familiar sight, and it can come in many forms. A sprawling concrete plaza 
with just a handful of meandering pedestrians. A hulking, empty arena protected by chain 
link. A storefront bearing the five rings. These are some of the lasting legacies of the 
Olympic Games.  
 In recent years, the concept of ‘legacy’ has become more prevalent in popular 
discourse surrounding the Games. As the Olympics have grown so as to become a 
sporting mega-event, so has the audience for the Games become global in scale. As more 
and more money is invested in the Games, the desire to create a positive and enduring 
Olympic legacy has intensified, and so has the pressure to successfully manufacture such 
a legacy. 
 Legacy is a complex term, especially as it relates to the Olympics. It can refer to 
profit margins, political climates, or medal counts. But perhaps the most tangible form of 
legacy exists as infrastructure, and cities have increasingly viewed the Olympics as a 
means by which to improve their physical urban fabric. By using the promise of the 
Games as a way to access funding, both public and private, cities can begin to develop 
infrastructure before the Olympics even occur. The Games, now enormous in scale, 
provide adequate justification to engage in projects such as the construction of transport 
systems or the installation of street lighting—projects that cities have been seeking to 
accomplish for years yet have lacked funding for. But the Games also require pieces of 
infrastructure that—on their own—have no clear post-Games purpose, such as extraneous 
sporting arenas or press centers. The modifications to the urban fabric that the Olympics 
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demand can be difficult to implement and incorporate. Each city adopts a somewhat 
different approach, and each city’s ensuing legacy has been strongly influenced by its 
Olympic planning methodology. 
 The intention of this thesis is, broadly, to analyze the way in which Olympic cities 
grapple with the complex problem of hosting the Games. This analysis is conducted from 
an infrastructural and planning point of view, focusing on the development of 
infrastructure as a means to accommodate the Olympics, but also examining the ways in 
which infrastructure is incorporated (or not incorporated) into the city. Using two case 
studies, Barcelona 1992 and Athens 2004, this thesis seeks to better understand the 
Olympic city, involving historical, political, and economic perspectives, all the while 
focusing on infrastructure as an ultimate expression of urbanity. 
This thesis also relies on the theoretical framework of globalization set forth by 
Saskia Sassen. Sassen’s work addresses the effects that processes of globalization have 
had on cities, including changes in economic patterns and the role of urban infrastructure. 
She locates the current economic structure of cities at the intersection of two processes: 
the increasing scale and complexity of economies and linkages between cities, and the 
shifting orientation of economic industries toward the service sector.1 These dual trends 
will underscore analyses of both the overarching historical development of the Olympic 
Games as well as the two case studies selected for this thesis. 
 
Chapter Two of this thesis traces a history of the Summer Olympic Games from 
their revival in Athens in 1896 to their return to the city in 2004. In this discussion, 
                                                
1 Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 
2006), 81-82. 
2 John R. Gold and Margaret M. Gold, “The Summer Olympics,” in Olympic Cities: City 
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themes such as the increasing scale of the Games, the growing importance of Olympic 
infrastructure, and the rise of city branding are emphasized. Each of the thesis’ two case 
studies is situated within this chronology so that the critical historical juncture at which 
each sits may be better understood. 
 Chapter Three provides a case study of the 1992 Olympic Games, held in 
Barcelona, Spain. The chapter seeks to outline a broad history of planning in the city, 
identifying the Olympics as the pivot for a shift in planning ideology. Chapter Three 
relates the history of planning in Barcelona, the planning of infrastructure for the 1992 
Olympics specifically, and both the immediate and long-term effects of such Olympic 
planning strategies. The emphasis in this case study is on the development of 
infrastructure in the city, but this necessarily includes a discussion of Barcelona’s city 
planning philosophy. The chapter charts a trajectory from 19th-century city planning 
ideology focused on small-scale improvements to public space to a post-Games emphasis 
on the attraction of global private capital through the construction of service-based 
infrastructure. Ultimately, the chapter seeks to clarify shifts in overarching city planning 
practices in Barcelona through the consideration of specific infrastructure projects. 
 Chapter Four is a case study of the 2004 Olympic Games, hosted by Athens, 
Greece. This chapter is formatted in a similar way to Chapter Three to allow for clarity 
and the ability to easily compare the two Games. Chapter Four examines Athens’ 
attempts to replicate the Olympic planning model forwarded by Barcelona, as well as the 
city’s infrastructural legacy in the post-Games era. The chapter focuses on the relative 
failure of poorly coordinated, publicly driven projects in comparison with the relative 
 7 
success of self-generated economic nodes catering to service sector activities, specifically 
in the realms of culture and leisure. 
 Chapter Five serves as a discussion and conclusion to the thesis. The chapter 
begins by making comparisons between the two case studies and summarizing the 
content of each case study chapter. This discussion is then placed within the theoretical 
framework of Saskia Sassen’s analysis on the economic development and globalization 
of cities. Finally, the thesis concludes with a brief discussion of the 2016 Games held in 
Rio de Janeiro and the potential future direction of Olympic planning. 
 Ultimately, this thesis seeks to provide an analytical understanding of why cities 
bid for the Olympics, as well as what effects the Games have on both the physical 
infrastructure and planning ideology of cities across the world. 
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Chapter Two 
A Brief History of Summer Olympic Infrastructure 
 
 
 The significance of infrastructure’s role in Olympic planning cannot be fully 
understood without an historical analysis of the Olympic Games themselves. The modern 
Olympics have existed for a little more than a century, and in that time they have grown 
from a somewhat localized gathering of idealistic aristocrats and athletes to a sporting 
mega-event that is global in scale.  
The development of the Games has in many ways been closely intertwined with 
processes of globalization. The relationship between host cities and the Games has 
changed with increasing urbanization. Similarly, the financial viability of the Olympics 
has been affected by global economic conditions. By tracing the history of the Olympic 
Games, specifically the Summer Olympics, a better understanding of the increasing role 
of infrastructure may be gleaned. Ultimately, this understanding will serve as the basis 
for an analysis of two Olympic cities and their infrastructural planning legacies: 
Barcelona 1992 and Athens 2004.  
 
Olympic Revival 
The history of the modern Olympic Games may in fact begin with the banning of 
the ancient Olympics by Emperor Theodosius I in 393 AD.2 The prohibition of the 
ancient Games laid the foundation for the accumulation of collective memory, and the 
memory that was constructed in the following centuries was one that was 
                                                
2 John R. Gold and Margaret M. Gold, “The Summer Olympics,” in Olympic Cities: City 
Agendas, Planning and the World’s Games, 1896-2016, ed. John R. Gold and Margaret 
M. Gold (New York: Routledge, 2011), 17. 
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overwhelmingly positive, influenced by both nostalgia and nationalism. Numerous 
attempts to revive the Games were subsequently made, but none were met with any 
degree of success.3 
In 1894, Pierre de Frédy, Baron de Coubertin, in an effort to revive the Games, 
invited 78 delegates to an International Congress of Amateurs. Coubertin believed that 
the revival of the Games could mitigate inter-imperial rivalries and create a sense of 
global harmony.4 He termed his vision the ‘Olympic Movement’ and was joined by other 
wealthy elites in his endeavor.5 One of the founding principles of the Movement was that 
educational reform could be accomplished through physical activity. Relying on the elite 
19th century ideals of “classical liberalism, volunteerism, philanthropy, [and] 
amateurism,” the Olympic Movement sought to produce both peace and education on the 
global scale.6 Coubertin also saw the Olympic Movement as having domestic benefits. 
He viewed physical fitness as being crucial to military preparedness, and also felt that the 
Games would contribute to the betterment of class relations, allowing for social harmony 
within individual nations.7  
In an effort to formalize his vision, Coubertin produced an Olympic Charter, 
which was to guide the development of the Games in the coming decades.8 The Olympic 
Charter created the International Olympic Committee (IOC), which is the central 
governing body of the Olympic Games. The IOC is tasked with selecting host cities as 
                                                
3 Gold, “The Summer Olympics,” 20. 
4 George Wright, “The Olympic Ruling Class,” in Transforming Classes, ed. Leo Panitch 
and Greg Albo (New York: NYU Press, 2014), 217. 
5 Wright, “The Olympic Ruling Class,” 216. 
6 Wright, “The Olympic Ruling Class,” 216. 
7 Wright, “The Olympic Ruling Class,” 218. 
8 Gold, “The Summer Olympics,” 24. 
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well as enforcing guidelines for the operation of the Games. The IOC also oversees 
National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and local Organizing Committees for the 
Olympic Games (OCOGs).9 NOCs act at the state level, representing athletes from their 
respective countries, while OCOGs operate at the local level, managing the 
implementation of the Games and coordinating between all tiers of administration and 
government.10 
With the organizational framework for the fulfillment of his vision, Coubertin was 
able to inaugurate the first modern Olympics in 1896. 
 
Analytical Framework 
The history of the modern Olympics can be examined through a number of 
different lenses. For the purposes of this thesis, it is most important to focus on the 
development of Olympic infrastructure over the course of the 20th century, the role that 
infrastructure played in each staging of the Games, and how the development of 
infrastructure was connected with certain conditions of globalization over time.  
The development of the Summer Olympic Games may be seen as a continuum 
onto which can be projected several trends, such as the increasing scale and scope of the 
Games, the conceptual shift in ‘Olympic legacy’ from a peace movement to a brand, or 
the related shift in infrastructural design from temporary structures to permanent ones.11 
                                                
9 Wright, “The Olympic Ruling Class,” 216. 
10 Judith Grant Long, “Rethinking Olympic Infrastructure,” LSE Cities, accessed 21 
October 2016, https://lsecities.net/media/objects/articles/rethinking-olympic-
infrastructure/en-gb/. 
11 Daphné Bolz, “Olympic Heritage – An International Legacy: The Invention of the 
Modern Olympic Stadium from Coubertin to 1948,” in Sport, History, and Heritage: 
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Understanding these long-term trends is useful for contextualizing the Barcelona and 
Athens Games, as each occupies a specific moment in Olympic history. The changing 
rhetoric of the Olympic Movement during the 20th and early 21st centuries is also a factor 
in the planning of the Games and the assessment of each event’s legacy. By outlining a 
brief history of the Summer Olympic Games that addresses these concerns, an analytical 
framework may be provided for examining the Barcelona and Athens Games in a later 
portion of this thesis. 
Several scholars have attempted to systematize trends involving the increasing 
scale and permanence of Olympic infrastructure. Jon Coaffee breaks up the development 
of the Summer Olympics as it relates to urban impact into four rough phases. The first 
phase ranges from 1896 to 1904 and is characterized by minimal urban impact. The 
second phase, lasting from 1908 to 1932, is characterized by increasing urban impact. 
This is the period during which the Olympics become a somewhat larger event and 
facilities are constructed specifically for the Games. The third phase, the postwar period 
from 1948 to 1956, is characterized by economic austerity, and thus little urban impact. 
The fourth phase is from 1960 onward. This ongoing period is characterized by 
substantial urban impact, with heavy investment in public infrastructure, especially 
transport.12  
Similarly, Martin Wimmer attempts to classify periods of the Games by their 
Olympic Village building typologies. Wimmer’s first stage, extending from 1896 until 
around 1948, is characterized by bungalow-style housing and single-family apartments.  
                                                                                                                                            
Studies in Public Representation, ed. Jeffrey Hill, Kevin Moore, and Jason Wood 
(Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2012), 235. 
12 Coaffee, “Urban Regeneration and Renewal,” 184. 
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Figure 1: A list of Summer Olympics host cities from 1896 to 2004.  
Coaffee and Wimmer’s phasing schemes are presented as well. 
 
Year Host City Coaffee Wimmer 
1896 Athens Phase 1 Phase 1 
1900 Paris     
1904 St. Louis     
1908 London Phase 2   
1912 Stockholm     
1916 No Games Held     
1920 Antwerp     
1924 Paris     
1928 Amsterdam     
1932 Los Angeles     
1936 Berlin     
1940 No Games Held     
1944 No Games Held     
1948 London Phase 3   
1952 Helsinki   Phase 2 
1956 Melbourne     
1960 Rome Phase 4   
1964 Tokyo     
1968 Mexico City   Phase 3 
1972 Munich     
1976 Montreal     
1980 Moscow     
1984 Los Angeles   Phase 4 
1988 Seoul     
1992 Barcelona     
1996 Atlanta     
2000 Sydney     
2004 Athens     
 
The second stage lasts from 1952 until 1964, and is characterized by multi-family 
housing blocks. The third stage, ranging from 1968 to 1980, is characterized by large 
housing complexes organized in high-rise apartment buildings. The fourth stage is from 
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1984 onward, and is characterized by Olympic Villages of varied forms, borrowing and 
mixing styles from the previous three phases.13  
The Coaffee and Wimmer classification systems are approximations, but they are 
useful for understanding the overarching trajectory of the Summer Games since their 
revival. In each case, the most salient trends are those of accumulating scale and 
permanence. 
 
Athens 1896 to Los Angeles 1932 
The first modern Olympics were held in Athens in 1896. The staging of the 
Games in its ancient home was meant to symbolize the connection between past and 
present. Events were held in the restored Panathenian Stadium, further ossifying the link 
between the modern and ancient Games.14 Because the Panathenian Stadium was 
available for use, very little new infrastructure was built for the Games, thus setting a 
standard for the expected amount of construction for the next several Olympics.  
This was, however, to the detriment of the following two Games. Paris 1900 and 
St. Louis 1904 invested very little in infrastructure, and the Games suffered for it, lacking 
both the spectacle and capacity of the Athens Olympics. Following the Games in St. 
Louis, Coubertin asserted the necessity for a proper stadium for hosting events.15 The 
legacy of these two Games is further overshadowed by the World’s Fairs held in each 
                                                
13 Francesc Muñoz, “Olympic Urbanism and Olympic Villages: Planning Strategies in 
Olympic Host Cities, London 1908 to London 2012,” in Sports Mega-Events: Social 
Scientific Analyses of a Global Phenomenon, ed. John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 177-178. 
14 Mike O’Mahony, Olympic Visions: Images of the Games through History (London: 
Reaktion Books, 2012), 141. 
15 Bolz, “Olympic Heritage,” 235. 
 14 
city at the same time as the Olympics.16 Originally planned as extensions to the Fairs, 
these Olympics ultimately suffered from inadequate facilities and poor planning. 
The London Olympics of 1908 marked somewhat of a turning point in the way 
Olympic infrastructure was conceived and understood. For the first time, a new 
permanent stadium was constructed specifically for the Games. The White City Stadium 
was a multi-purpose arena capable of seating 93,000 spectators.17 The stadium contained 
tracks for running and cycling, a swimming pool, and facilities for archery and 
gymnastics events. Restaurants and dressing rooms were located beneath the stands.18 
The White City Stadium, unlike facilities in the previous two Olympics, was built 
to last beyond the Games, even if its eventual purpose was unclear; for nearly twenty 
years after the Games, the stadium was left unused. Ultimately, it was given to a 
greyhound racing association in 1926, and then eventually demolished in 1985.19 But 
beyond pioneering the implementation of a permanent central arena, the London Games 
also set a precedent for improvements to the host city’s infrastructure. The construction 
of the stadium necessitated an extension of the Central London Railway and the creation 
of a new station at Wood Lane.20 For the first time, the Olympics prompted an expansion 
of a city’s infrastructure. London 1908 demonstrated that the scale of the Games was 
increasing and that cities were beginning to adapt to this through the construction of more 
permanent facilities. At the same time, cities were beginning to glimpse the opportunities 
presented by the Games for the improvement of the city itself. 
                                                
16 Richard Cashman, “Legacy,” in Staging the Olympics: The Event and Its Impact, ed. 
Richard Cashman and Anthony Hughes (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1999), 184. 
17 Bolz, “Olympic Heritage,” 237. 
18 Gold, “The Summer Olympics,” 28. 
19 Gold, “The Summer Olympics,” 29; Bolz, “Olympic Heritage,” 237. 
20 Gold, “The Summer Olympics,” 28. 
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Following London’s lead, Stockholm, which hosted the Olympics in 1912, built a 
new stadium in the Royal Zoological Garden that was later used for winter festivals and 
ice skating.21 Berlin, which was slated to host the Games in 1916, constructed the 
Deutsches Stadion and claimed direct inspiration from the White City Stadium. The 1916 
Games were ultimately cancelled due to the outbreak of World War I, but the Deutsches 
Stadion in turn inspired similar arenas in Cologne, Nuremberg, and Frankfurt.22 During 
the interwar years, permanent stadiums continued to be built for the Games, although 
these arenas were increasingly viewed as architectural statements rather than industrial 
achievements.23 The aesthetic value of Olympic infrastructure was beginning to be seen 
as an important aspect of planning for the Games, and cities responded by forwarding 
their own unique designs for infrastructure projects. 
The Los Angeles Games of 1932 marked another turning point in the 
infrastructural history of the Olympics for two reasons. One was that, for the first time, 
the Olympic Village became a permanent piece of architecture. From London 1908 to 
Amsterdam 1928, Olympic Villages were viewed as temporary housing strategies. The 
Antwerp Games of 1920, for example, placed athletes in local schools.24 In some cases 
teams were housed on the ships that had transported them to the Games.25 Los Angeles 
1932 was the first time that a permanent Olympic Village was constructed for the event.26 
                                                
21 Cashman, “Legacy,” 184. 
22 Bolz, “Olympic Heritage,” 237. 
23 Bolz, “Olympic Heritage,” 238. 
24 Cashman, “Legacy,” 185. 
25 Muñoz, “Olympic Urbanism,” 176. 
26 Gold, “The Summer Olympics,” 32. 
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The Village model pioneered in Los Angeles, and later replicated in Berlin 1936, was to 
build facilities for housing, entertainment, and leisure.27  
The second reason the Los Angeles Games were significant was that city branding 
began to play an important role in the planning of the Olympics. This had effects on 
decisions about the creation and manipulation of the city’s infrastructure. For the 1932 
Games, Los Angeles made a concerted effort toward portraying itself in a certain way. 
Palm trees were imported into the city and planted en masse in an attempt to impress 
visitors. The Los Angeles Coliseum was constructed, itself a striking piece of 
architecture.28 For the first time, Olympic infrastructure projects extended beyond just a 
formidable central arena. Planners were beginning to understand the process of hosting 
the Games as a citywide event, as well as an opportunity to craft a new urban image. This 
expansion, coupled with the increasing permanence of Olympic infrastructure, helped to 
bolster the Olympics’ status as a growing mega-event. 
 
Berlin 1936 to Mexico City 1968 
 The 1936 Games were held in Berlin during the era of Nazi rule. The Nazis 
continued to build on Los Angeles’ model for the construction of Olympic Villages. The 
architectural design of Doberitz Village was influenced by modernity and rationalism, yet 
even so, there existed a local aspect to the project; each house was named for a German 
city and decorated according to that city’s culture.29 This type of city-specific branding, 
                                                
27 Muñoz, “Olympic Urbanism,” 176. 
28 Bolz, “Olympic Heritage,” 238. 
29 Muñoz, “Olympic Urbanism,” 178. 
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inaugurated in Los Angeles and concretized in Berlin, foreshadowed the eventual 
exploitation of cities’ unique cultural heritages through processes of Olympic planning.  
The Berlin Games also saw the host city itself take a larger role in funding the 
Olympics. While the Games were originally mostly subsidized by the IOC, individual 
host cities were beginning to take on more of the burden of spending.30 This was 
especially evident in Berlin. As cities began to embrace the ‘city branding’ view of the 
Games, it became more imperative that host cities contribute to the financing of the 
event. Ostensibly, the more a city spent on improving its image for the Olympics, the 
more revenue it would later generate from tourism and other economic activities. And 
while this was not necessarily the case for Nazi Germany, it would come to be true for 
future host cities. 
No Olympics were held in either 1940 or 1944 due to World War II. When the 
Games resumed in London in 1948, it was during a period of austerity.31 As a result, the 
Olympics of the 1950s were largely unremarkable. Postwar designs for stadiums were 
more functional than anything else.32 
The 1960s, however, marked yet another turning point in the development of 
Olympic infrastructure. Beginning with Rome 1960, Olympic host cities resumed the 
trend of increasing investment in infrastructure as part of their planning for the games. 
Rome saw hosting the Games as an opportunity to build new roads and bridges, renovate 
                                                
30 Wright, “The Olympic Ruling Class,” 219. 
31 Jon Coaffee, “Urban Regeneration and Renewal,” in Olympic Cities: City Agendas, 
Planning and the World’s Games, 1896-2016, ed. John R. Gold and Margaret M. Gold 
(New York: Routledge, 2011), 182. 
32 O’Mahony, Olympic Visions, 142. 
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the city’s airport, install street lighting, and improve telecommunications networks.33 
Cities were seeing that long-term infrastructural improvements to their urban fabric could 
be merited by their status as hosts to the Olympics. Although the interventions made in 
Rome were piecemeal in nature, they revealed the possibility that citywide improvements 
could coincide with—and be justified by—planning for the Games. 
Tokyo 1964 followed Rome’s lead and coordinated their Games with the city’s 
ten-year development plan. This included the construction of housing, hotels, waste 
disposal systems, water supply systems, and a monorail system, as well as the renovation 
of the harbor.34 The Tokyo Olympics were also among the first to make a concerted effort 
toward crafting a unified ‘look’ for the Games. The graphic design of posters and 
pamphlets matched the architectural design of stadiums.35 The Tokyo Games furthered 
the understanding of the Olympics as a city branding event, where the host city is able to 
market itself to the rest of the world in an effort to increase the flow of capital into the 
metropolis. 
This trend continued with Mexico City 1968, and by the time of Munich 1972, the 
Olympics had grown massively in scale. In the twenty-year period between Helsinki 
1952 and Munich 1972, the number of countries represented at the Games had nearly 
doubled from 69 to 121; likewise, the number of participating athletes had increased from 
4,955 to 7,134.36 This was due in part to the Games being televised, and thus reaching a 
much larger audience.37  
                                                
33 Gold, “The Summer Olympics,” 37; Coaffee, “Urban Regeneration and Renewal,” 183. 
34 Gold, “The Summer Olympics,” 37. 
35 Gold, “The Summer Olympics,” 38. 
36 Wright, “The Olympic Ruling Class,” 221. 
37 Wright, “The Olympic Ruling Class,” 221. 
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Munich 1972 to Barcelona 1992 
For decades, cities had been moving toward a greater understanding of the 
Olympics as an opportunity for city marketing. Now, with the increased size and scope of 
the Games, the stakes were exceedingly high, and the significance placed on 
infrastructural investment and city branding was enormous. 
Yet, this awesome pressure laid the foundation for disaster. The Munich 
massacre, in which a hostage-taking situation resulted in the deaths of eleven Israeli 
athletes, five members of the Palestinian terrorist group Black September, and one 
German policeman, marred the Games.38 That the Olympics had grown so much in scale 
and that city branding had become so significant only served to exacerbate the harm done 
by the massacre. The events had unfolded on the global stage and with the reputation 
(and financial future) of the host city at stake. As a result, the images of both the 
Olympics and the city of Munich were badly damaged. 
Poor economic conditions tainted the Montreal Games of 1976. The Games were 
also affected by boycotts on the part of several African countries that opposed the 
admission of the New Zealand to the Games after its sporting teams had been in contact 
with apartheid South Africa.39  The 1980 Games in Moscow were similarly boycotted, 
this time by nations opposed to the Soviet Union.40  
This series of failures (difficulties with security, financial complications, and 
political animosities) precipitated a change in the IOC’s mission. Following the 1972 
Games, IOC president Avery Brundage stepped down and was succeeded by Lord 
                                                
38 Wright, “The Olympic Ruling Class,” 222. 
39 Donald Macintosh et al., Sport and Canadian Diplomacy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1994), 57. 
40 Wright, “The Olympic Ruling Class,” 222. 
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Killanin.41 Killanin, who was forced to deal with the financial issues and boycotts of the 
1976 and 1980 Games, understood these calamities to be linked to the ‘crisis of 
capitalism’ of the 1970s. Under his leadership, the mission of the IOC shifted from the 
promotion of a peace movement to the advocacy of large profits.42 Prior to the 1970s, the 
Olympic Movement was predicated on amateur competition. Its message was idealistic 
and wholly opposed to commercialism. But after the series of shocks during that decade, 
the Movement adopted a neoliberal stance, maintaining that the best way for the 
Olympics to succeed was to focus on profit-making. 
This ideal overtook infrastructural investment as the primary goal in Olympic 
planning, and was fully realized with the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles. Following the 
debacles of the 1970s, Los Angeles proved to be the only city willing to bid for the 1984 
Games after Tehran withdrew its application.43 Los Angeles embraced the IOC’s new 
for-profit model, financing the games with money acquired from ticket sales, television 
revenues, and corporate sponsorships. The negotiation of television rights was overseen 
by Killanin himself, thus bringing this lucrative process under IOC control.44 At the same 
time, investment in infrastructure was given a subordinate role. The Olympic Village—
the construction of which cities in preceding decades had viewed as an opportunity to 
build long-term housing stock—was essentially nonexistent; athletes were housed in pre-
existing university facilities.45 With the Los Angeles Games of 1984, investment in 
                                                
41 Wright, “The Olympic Ruling Class,” 222. 
42 Wright, “The Olympic Ruling Class,” 217. 
43 Wright, “The Olympic Ruling Class,” 222. 
44 Wright, “The Olympic Ruling Class,” 223. 
45 Muñoz, “Olympic Urbanism,” 177. 
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permanent infrastructure was seen as a less viable way to make money than the selling of 
television rights or corporate sponsorships, and was thus less important.  
Seoul 1988, however, saw the return of investment in infrastructure, although not 
without criticism. Seoul followed a model of urban regeneration on a large scale, which 
essentially amounted to urban renewal. The city sought to mitigate the effects of this by 
incorporating more localized aspects of South Korean culture, such as the placement of 
high-rise buildings around low-rise ones to protect them.46 Still, however, the overall 
program was condemned for its prioritization of infrastructural improvement at a social 
cost. High-density, walkable neighborhoods were demolished and commercial high-rises 
were erected in their place. Many saw this as an effort to ‘modernize’ the image of the 
city at the cost of its historic infrastructure and social cohesion.47  
Four years later, Barcelona 1992 sought to address the criticism sustained by the 
Seoul Games, and many consider the Barcelona Games to have been a huge success from 
an infrastructural and branding standpoint. Because the 1992 Olympics serve as one of 
the case studies for this thesis, they will be discussed only briefly here so as to provide an 
understanding of their situation within the chronology of the Summer Games. 
Much of the discourse of success in Barcelona surrounds its cohesive integration 
of city branding techniques with citywide urban redevelopment and planning. Barcelona, 
like many cities prior, viewed its status as a host city as an opportunity to improve its 
urban infrastructure as well as its image. However, more than any other Olympic city 
before or possibly since, Barcelona was able to integrate the Olympics into an 
overarching city plan—one that had existed before the Games were awarded and whose 
                                                
46 Muñoz, “Olympic Urbanism,” 180. 
47 Gold, “The Summer Olympics,” 44. 
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vision extended far beyond the Games’ conclusion.48 Furthermore, the city was aided by 
the fact that approximately 88% of necessary facilities for the Games were already 
available for use and only fifteen new venues needed to be constructed.49 This allowed 
Barcelona to focus more of its attention on citywide infrastructure projects that were not 
necessarily directly associated with the Olympics, but would benefit from increased 
funding due to the Games. In fact, 83% of expenditures went toward improvements on 
city infrastructure while a mere 17% went toward the Games themselves.50  
 For the 1992 Olympic Games, Barcelona renovated an existing stadium and 
created four Olympic areas with 4,500 apartments and 5,000 hotel rooms.51 In terms of 
infrastructure outside the immediate realm of the Games, the city constructed a new Ring 
Road to connect venues, two communication towers, new cultural centers and museums, 
expansions to the airport and the metro system, and five kilometers of new beaches.52 
Even infrastructure projects that were related directly to the Olympics were employed 
with a sense of integration into the city as a whole. The renovation of Barcelona’s 
waterfront was widely seen as a result of both the city’s implementation of projects based 
on long-term planning and its understanding of how the post-Olympic relationship 
between existing and newly created areas of the city would play out.53 
 But this largely positive appraisal of the Barcelona Olympics belies the negative 
consequences of its planning strategy that have become evident in succeeding years. The 
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regeneration of the waterfront, while touted as a positive outcome of the Games, has 
increased housing prices across the city, forcing many longtime residents to leave.54 
Additionally, following the Barcelona Games, inflation in the city increased and 
unemployment rose.55 And on a larger scale the city branding approaches used for the 
Barcelona Olympics have increasingly placed control of the city in the hands of private 
agents. Generally, post-Olympic city planning in Barcelona has become less focused on 
the improvement of the lives of the city’s residents, and more attuned to strategies that 
seek to maximize the attraction of capital. This is to say that despite the widely held 
understanding that the Barcelona Games were an unequivocal success, the 1992 
Olympics have had a complicated legacy. This legacy will be further discussed in a later 
portion of this thesis. 
 
Atlanta 1996 to Athens 2004 
 The Atlanta 1996 Games returned somewhat to the model set forth by Los 
Angeles 1984. In contrast to Barcelona, the city focused most of its spending on sports 
facilities.56 There was no overall city plan, although some of the venues found post-
Games uses; the main stadium would be turned into a ballpark.57 The Atlanta Games 
were conceptualized as a more temporary event than the Barcelona Olympics; athletes 
were housed in university dormitories and most of the Olympic district was dismantled 
following the Games.58 
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 Beginning with the Sydney 2000 Games, the IOC began to recommend a more 
sustainable approach to Olympic planning.59 The site selected for the 2000 Games was 
Homebush Bay, previously a slaughterhouse then a brickworks.60 Although the original 
scheme for an Olympic Eco-Village was never realized, the Games did prove to be 
sustainable in other ways. The Olympic master plan, for example, made use of several 
existing structures including the Aquatic Center and the Main Stadium.61  
 Athens 2004 followed the Sydney Games, and initial planning for the event was 
influenced by the IOC’s sustainable discourse. Early on in the process, planners claimed 
that the Games would be the “first Olympiad to use 100% green energy” and intended to 
reuse existing infrastructure in the city.62 However, the majority of these plans were 
ultimately abandoned and the final scheme for the Olympics called for inefficient, 
spatially dispersed infrastructure.63  
 Some of the more positive outcomes of the Athens Games were the improved 
transportation networks in the city. Pedestrian routes were created to link Athens’ various 
archaeological sites and two new metro lines were built.64 However, the negative 
consequences remain far more visible. Much of the infrastructure built for the Games is 
no longer heavily used, or even used at all. The Olympic Sports Complex at Maroussi, for 
example, is used only for occasional concerts.65 As the city finds it increasingly difficult 
to meet maintenance costs, several of these venues have fallen into disrepair. Many have 
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criticized the city for lacking a clear post-Games plan for the infrastructure that was 
built.66  
To some degree, the Athens Games represented an attempt to emulate the 
‘Barcelona model’ set forth by the 1992 Olympics. Unlike Barcelona, however, Athens’ 
primary Olympic legacy is one of increasing urban fragmentation brought on by 
incoherent planning and a lack of long-term vision. But much like Barcelona, post-
Olympic Athens is marked by the growing influence of private investment in the 
development of infrastructure. Only thirteen years removed from the Games, the legacy 
of Athens 2004 remains a complex one. This, too, will be discussed in greater depth in a 
later portion of this thesis. 
  
 The trajectory of the Summer Olympic Games from their revival in 1896 to their 
return to Athens in 2004 is characterized by increasing scale, intensity, and permanence. 
Begun as an idealistic peace movement of sorts, the Olympics have transformed into a 
sporting mega-event dominated by massive construction projects, huge flows of capital, 
and concerted efforts at city branding. The reflection of these trends over the course of 
the 20th and early 21st centuries may be seen in the changing manifestations of Olympic 
infrastructure.  
This planning and development of infrastructure reflects a fundamental dilemma 
of Olympic planning since the Los Angeles Games of 1984. That dilemma centers on the 
reconciliation of two major aims of Olympic host cities. On the one hand is the desire to 
not only profit from the Games themselves, but to use the elite status of host city to create 
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a lasting framework for the continued attraction of global private investment. Such a 
framework has located its foundation in the service sector, specifically the economy of 
culture and leisure. On the other hand is a focus on long-term planning for a city’s own 
residents. Olympic cities, now more than ever, understand the opportunity to host the 
Games as a means by which to accomplish far-reaching infrastructure and planning goals 
that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. Of course, there exists a significant overlap 
in these two goals. Large-scale infrastructure projects, for example, are able to 
circumvent bureaucratic planning processes by way of increased private capital. Yet the 
complexity of navigating the two aims remains a potent force Olympic cities must reckon 
with. Simply put, cities must negotiate between planning for the attraction of private 
capital and planning for the city’s own inhabitants. 
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Chapter Three 
Case Study: Barcelona 1992 
 
 
 The 1992 Olympics are often cited as the paragon of mega-event infrastructural 
planning initiatives. From an infrastructural point of view, the improvements made to the 
city of Barcelona have widely been seen as a successful leveraging of the Games for the 
lasting benefit of the host city.  
 The Barcelona Olympics are also often recognized as a turning point for the 
political and economic understanding of the Games. The first Summer Games to be 
staged following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 1992 Olympics helped to 
promote global capitalism and the new service-based economy. While the 1984 Los 
Angeles Games forwarded a new understanding of the way in which private investment 
could be coupled with a mega-event such as the Olympics to help promote a city, the 
1992 Olympics linked those two concepts to physical infrastructural improvements.  
 The 1992 Games also represented a turning point for the city of Barcelona itself. 
The Olympics marked the transition from publicly planned, small-scale infrastructural 
improvements to larger schemes funded by private investors. In many ways the 1992 
Games actually facilitated this transition by opening the city to the global market. Pre-
Games planning initiatives that focused on the improvement of public space gave way to 
post-Games enterprises intent on maximizing profits. And while the legacy of the 1992 
Olympics has been largely positive, many have seen the gentrification of Barcelona’s 
neighborhoods and the commodification of the city’s unique culture as enormous 
drawbacks. 
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 The 1992 Games continue to represent an important moment in Olympic history, 
heralding a new era of planning focused on city branding and the service sector, 
specifically the economy of culture and leisure. For this alone, the Barcelona Olympics 
have forever changed the way the Games are understood. 
 
Barcelona’s Planning History 
 In order to understand the planning scheme devised for the 1992 Games, it is 
important to contextualize it within the broader history of urban planning in Barcelona. 
The city’s developmental history before being awarded the Games in 1986 was 
punctuated by several citywide master plans, as well as more minor interventions. Many 
of the planning techniques developed in the pre-Games years contributed to the planning 
framework for the 1992 Olympics. 
 The oldest part of Barcelona is the city center, called the Ciutat Vella. It is 
comprised of the Barri Gòtic, El Raval, and Barceloneta. The Barri Gòtic and El Raval 
were constructed in the Roman and Medieval periods, and Barceloneta during the 18th 
century.67 The Ciutat Vella is characterized by historical infrastructure and an extremely 
dense urban fabric.  
Surrounding the Ciutat Vella is a district called the Eixample. Faced with the need 
to expand and renovate the city in the mid-19th century, Barcelona forewent the 
implementation of Haussmann-style urban renewal and instead opted for Ildefons Cerdà’s 
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plan for the Eixample.68 Cerdà’s scheme emphasized the ordered expansion of the city 
through a uniform grid system of street blocks. The plan incorporated green space and 
sought to ease flows of traffic. Cerdà believed that the homogeneity of the Eixample’s 
street grid would produce social equity. In execution, however, the Eixample did not 
adhere completely to the plan, and as a result became a densely populated and socially 
unbalanced district.69 The Eixample was not completed until 1929, but in 1905 Léon 
Jaussely created a plan to stitch together the district with the Ciutat Vella, seeking to 
redirect the development of the city toward a more compact urban morphology.70 
Organized planning in Barcelona ceased with the rule of dictator Francisco 
Franco, who came to power in 1939. Barcelona had not sided with Franco during the 
Spanish Civil War, and so was punished through neglect. During Franco’s rule, the city 
expanded uncontrollably and infrastructure deteriorated. Factories began to populate the 
city’s waterfront, restricting access to the Mediterranean Sea.71 But by the 1970s, 
processes of deindustrialization were causing these factories to become abandoned and 
signaling the onset of severe infrastructural and economic decline.72  
In 1970, mayor Josep Porcioles, who led the city for fifteen years under Franco, 
strategized to rejuvenate the city through a bid for Expo 82. Though the bid failed, the 
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notion of improving the city through the hosting of a mega-event was forwarded for the 
first time since Barcelona’s attempt to claim the 1936 Olympics from Berlin.73 
In 1974, under the direction of mayor Enric Massó, Barcelona began to draft the 
Pla General Metropolità (PGM). The plan was grand in scale and sought to create both 
new green spaces and new road networks, as well as repurpose abandoned industrial 
sites.74 This, coupled with the PGM’s focus on the reconstruction of Barcelona’s urban 
space rather than its extension, laid the groundwork for Olympic planning just a decade 
later.75 In 1975 Franco died and in 1976 the PGM was completed.76  
With the end of Francoism came the rise of the Socialist Party of Catalonia. The 
dual processes of deindustrialization and globalization had contributed to an economic 
crisis in many parts of Europe, and Barcelona was no exception.77 The municipal 
government, as well as architects and designers, felt that intentional planning 
interventions were needed to address Barcelona’s economic and infrastructural 
shortcomings. The new left-wing government was prepared to use the recently-passed 
PGM as a framework for these interventions.78   
In 1980, mayor Narcís Serra appointed architect Oriol Bohigas to the Head of 
Urban Planning.79 At this time, there existed a discourse of ‘recovery planning’ that 
sought to remedy the years of neglect under Franco with a renewed focus on the unique 
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cultural identity of Barcelona.80 Notions of Barcelona’s identity were tied up with the 
city’s architectural heritage, and improvements to infrastructure were seen as a means by 
which to better the city’s image.  
However, the struggling economy of the 1980s forced Barcelona to scale back its 
plans. Because of this, and also because he believed in the importance of specification in 
planning, Bohigas hired architects to design small-scale public spaces and public art. He 
felt that specific, intentional interventions in certain neighborhoods could renew a sense 
of vibrancy in those communities and contribute to more widespread positive effects. 
Bohigas further believed that these interventions should be publicly driven.81 In 
conjunction with these new public spaces, Bohigas oversaw the restoration of the city’s 
historic architecture.82 During this time, notions of improving the city’s image were 
linked with the creation of public space. The intention was to improve the city for the 
sake of its own inhabitants. 
 Between 1980 and 1987, hundreds of small parks and public spaces were created 
across Barcelona.83 Some of the larger interventions, such as the Parc de l’Espanya 
Industrial, utilized abandoned industrial land, a technique which would later be expanded 
for the Olympics.84 Other projects, such as the Moll de la Fusta, began the process of 
connecting the city to the waterfront, which had been separated by abandoned factories 
and a railway line.85 While many Barcelonans viewed these projects as positive urban 
interventions, others were more critical. Some lamented Bohigas’ focus on sculptural and 
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artistic interventions, citing the need to prioritize green space in a city that lacked such.86 
More recent criticisms have centered on the contribution of Bohigas’ plans to the 
densification of the city, and have linked this with the increasing privatization of land.87 
 Retrospective criticisms of Bohigas’ scheme tend to emphasize the link between 
the planning techniques he used and those implemented after the Games which focused 
on attracting private investment. At the time, however, Bohigas made explicit his belief 
in publicly driven planning initiatives.88 Even if mayor Narcís Serra was interested in 
attracting capital through tourism, Bohigas ostensibly sought to better the city for its own 
people.89 
 Despite the progress being made with small-scale interventions, city planners 
believed that large-scale improvements could be enacted under the right circumstances. 
To this end, a bid for the 1992 Olympics was made; the city announced its candidature in 
1981.90 In 1982, Pasqual Maragall was elected mayor of Barcelona, and in 1983 he 
appointed Joan Busquets to replace Bohigas as Head of Urban Planning.91 Bohigas’ 
planning initiatives were for the most part continued under this new leadership. But in 
1986, Barcelona was awarded 1992 Olympic Games, and the city’s planning strategy was 
forced to respond.92  
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Planning for the Games 
 The promise of the Olympics fundamentally shifted Barcelona’s planning 
strategy, ensuring the city far more public and private funds than it otherwise would have 
had.93 While the city still intended to emphasize publicly driven infrastructure projects, it 
was able to expand the scale of these interventions. And although Barcelona sought to 
keep the focus of its urban improvement projects centered on its residents, the city also 
understood that it was now on the international stage. The Olympics were, and continue 
to be, a global event, and infrastructure projects needed to shift their focus so as to cater 
to foreign investment as well. Even if the city wanted to maintain the prioritization of its 
people, such a perspective was incompatible with the global scale of the Games. 
 The general strategy Barcelona adopted for the Games was to distill the number 
of Olympic zones to only four, locating them at crucial points along the periphery of the 
city. It was also important that any infrastructure built specifically for the Games had a 
clear post-Olympic use.94 To some extent, these two concepts went hand-in-hand: by 
locating each zone at a specific point in the city, their use during the Olympics could 
activate the sites and spur long-term investment. Though the scale of the projects had 
increased, the post-Franco era ideology of generating maximum output from minimum 
input was still present. 
 The four Olympic zones comprise the infrastructure projects related most directly 
to the Games. They are: Montjuïc, Diagonal, Vall d’Hebron, and Poblenou.95 All four 
sites are located on the periphery of the Eixample. 
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Figure 2: Olympic site at Montjuïc (Photo by the author). 
 
 
 
 
The main Olympic area was situated atop the mountain of Montjuïc in the 
southern part of the city. Already extant were a park and a stadium originally constructed 
for the 1929 World’s Fair. Though the site was neglected during the Franco era, many of 
the park facilities survived into the 1980s.96 The project for Montjuïc included the 
renovation of the stadium by architects Vittori Gregotti and Federico Correa.97 This was 
to be the main Olympic Stadium. Together with three other buildings atop the hill (the 
Palau Sant Jordi for gymnastics and volleyball, the Bernat Picorell Swimming Pools, and 
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the INEFC for wrestling), this constituted the Olympic Ring.98 Palau Sant Jordi and the 
INEFC were designed by renowned architects Arata Isozaki and Ricardo Bofill, 
respectively.99 Amidst the natural undulations of Montjuïc hill, the Olympic Ring stood 
as a starkly axial design.100  
 
Figure 3: Olympic site at Montjuïc (Photo by the author). 
 
 
 
 
 The Diagonal site was in the southwest of Barcelona. It was centered on the 
Avinguda Diagonal motorway and contained the highest number of pre-existing sports 
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facilities of the four main Olympic areas.101 The plan for this site was drafted by Oriol 
Clos and Maria Rubert, and sought to repurpose the existing public and private sports 
facilities for use during the Games.102 Attempts were also made to integrate the Diagonal 
site with the towns of L’Hospitalet de Llobregat and Esplugues.103 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of primary Olympic sites in Barcelona:  
1) Vall d’Hebron, 2) Poblenou, 3)Montjuïc, 4) Diagonal  
(Source map from Google Earth, modified by the author using Photoshop). 
 
 
 
 
The third Olympic site, Vall d’Hebron, was located in the northeast part of the 
city at the base of the Collserola Mountains. By placing this site in a working-class 
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neighborhood that lacked many services, planners hoped they could generate investment 
and improve the area. Sports facilities, including tennis courts and an archery range, as 
well as 489 dwellings were constructed there.104 The plan for the site was conceived by 
Edward Bru and, unlike the axial design of Montjuïc, was more organic. And while much 
of the newly-built architecture for the Games was criticized as being uninspiring and 
bland, the changing rooms at Vall d’Hebron designed by Enric Miralles and Carme Pinos 
were praised for their beauty.105  
 The fourth Olympic site built for the Games was Poblenou. Here, on land 
previously occupied by abandoned factories and warehouses, was built the Olympic 
Village. The project, overseen by Bohigas’ architecture firm MBM, involved the razing 
of the site and the erasure of all remnants of its industrial past.106 The scheme to build 
housing on the site had actually been drawn up before the awarding of the Olympics, and 
MBM’s initial plans were altered slightly with the announcement of the Games in 1986. 
The plans were changed so that the development would first act as an Olympic Village, 
then be converted to permanent housing after the Games.107 The design of the Village, 
officially called Nova Icària, was intended to be a somewhat public initiative. The master 
plan of four superblocks, similar in form to those of Cerdà’s Eixample, was laid out by 
MBM, but the design of the individual interventions in the Village were distributed 
amongst 33 separate architectural firms, thereby dispersing control of the project’s 
design.108 MBM’s idea was to modernize the historical urban form of the Eixample. 
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 In addition to the Olympic Village, the Poblenou site featured two new 
skyscrapers built directly on the waterfront, the Torre Mapfre and the Hotel Arts.109 The 
railway line which had divided the city from the shoreline was submerged, allowing for 
the reclamation of 4.2 kilometers of new beachfront. A new Olympic port was also 
constructed.110 Portions of the Ronda del Litoral were covered with park space so as to 
further link the city with the waterfront.111 In all, over 1,500 new homes and 220 new 
commercial spaces were created, rendering the Poblenou intervention the most 
substantial of the four Olympic sites.112 
 Besides the core four sites, there existed additional infrastructure projects that, 
while less directly related to the Olympics themselves, were made possible through 
increased investment in the city as a whole during the pre-Games period. These included 
two telecommunications towers designed by prominent architects, the Torre de Collserola 
and the Torre de Telefònica.113 Additionally, ring roads were created to ease traffic. 
These thoroughfares were designed to vary in capacity based on the neighborhood 
through which they passed, as well as pass underground when possible, so as to minimize 
the potentially divisive effects of the new routes.114   
 Infrastructure built for the Olympics changed Barcelona’s culture of planning in a 
number of ways. For one, the Games necessitated a shift from the small-scale urban 
interventions of the late 1970s and early 1980s to much larger infrastructure projects, 
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some of which involved the decimation and reconstruction of entire neighborhoods, as 
was the case with Poblenou.  
This shift in the physical scale of projects forced a similar shift in their target 
audience. While the interventions of the post-Franco era were aimed at improving the 
lives of Barcelonans in specific neighborhoods, the projects of the pre-Olympics period 
served a global audience as well. Infrastructure came to be seen as a means by which to 
impress tourists attracted by the Games as well as the press. The understanding of whom 
urban infrastructure is for began to shift in the years leading up to the Games. 
Planning for the 1992 Games was influenced not only by the Olympics 
themselves, but also by what Saskia Sassen describes as the new service-oriented 
economy. Sassen notes that in the 1980s individual cities began to take on a larger role in 
the global economy, which was shifting from a focus on manufacturing to one on 
services. Needing to compete with each other economically, cities began to adapt 
themselves to the development of service-related infrastructure in order to attract global 
capital.115 In Barcelona’s case, the Olympics were viewed as an opportunity to develop 
that infrastructure, and the city’s own planning ideology was forced to shift as a result.  
 Planning in Barcelona also became an increasingly private endeavor due to the 
Olympics. Between 1986 and 1993, 32.7% of investment for Olympic projects was 
private. The majority of private funding was directed at housing, hotels, and roads, and 
more than a third of this funding came from foreign capital.116 The other 67.3% of 
investment was public, and this funding was funneled mostly into projects in the four 
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primary Olympic sites.117 Unlike the frugal years following the Franco regime, the 
promise of the Olympics brought new sources of funding. And while the public sector 
still controlled much of the planning process, the foundation for increasing private 
influence had been laid.  
While many of the fundamental planning principles of the post-Franco period 
remained in pre-Games schemes—such as the concept of generating widespread change 
through interventions at specific sites—the scale of these interventions had increased 
dramatically. Along with this went the increasing reliance on private investment and the 
growing influence of private agents. 
 
Infrastructural Legacy (Short-Term) 
 There are two ways of understanding the legacy of Barcelona’s Olympic 
infrastructure. The first is to investigate how the physical infrastructure built for the 
Games was used after the Olympics, and how it influenced its immediate urban 
surroundings. The second way is to understand how the planning and implementation of 
Olympic infrastructure changed city planning in Barcelona in the following decades. This 
involves a wider understanding of how the city brands itself and how it increasingly 
relates to the global market. 
 In terms of physical infrastructure built for the Games, the legacy is complicated. 
The prevailing discourse is a largely positive one, focused on the integration of Olympic 
projects with a long-term city planning strategy. Many have seen the construction of ring 
roads linking Olympic sites, the submergence of disruptive railway lines, and the 
                                                
117 Brunet, “Economic Analysis,” 9; Monclus, “Barcelona 1992,” 280. 
 41 
improvement of the city’s sewage system as projects that satisfied long-term goals for 
Barcelona.118 Indeed, shortly after some of these projects were completed, the praise 
began. Newspapers lauded the “gleaming new Olympic village and beachfront” which 
had replaced the “grimy industrial area that had blocked access to the sea for decades.”119 
During the Olympics and in the early post-Games period, press coverage of Barcelona’s 
infrastructure adopted a highly congratulatory tone. 
A certain amount of this positive appraisal stems from the fact that compared to 
other Olympic cities, many of Barcelona’s facilities have found post-Games uses. The 
Piscines Bernat Picornell is now the largest outdoor pool in the city. The Olympic 
stadium was for a time home to Barcelona’s second soccer team, Espanyol, and has also 
found a variety of sport-related uses. The renovated Montjuïc hill is used by pedestrians 
and cyclists. The beachfront has also become a popular recreational space, and the 
Olympic Village now serves as housing.120  
However, this largely positive discourse surrounding Barcelona’s post-Games 
infrastructure obscures the social inequality and unevenness of access that have 
developed as well. Construction of many Olympic facilities forced the demolition of 
apartment buildings and the relocation of Barcelona’s working-class residents, many of 
which had no choice but to move. Waterfront restaurants owned by Barcelonans were 
also destroyed to make way for the Olympic Village and the two new skyscrapers.121 
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Ironically, these tragedies have been swallowed by the overarching discourse of renewed 
access to the waterfront. 
In the years following the Games, much of the criticism directed at Barcelona’s 
Olympic infrastructure has centered on the Olympic Village. The master plan for the 
Village was generated by Bohigas’ firm MBM, and the development was technically 
called Nova Icària, named for a group of socialist utopians who had created a community 
on the site during the 19th century. The application of the name, however, came to be seen 
as an attempt at image-building, for the development had little to do with socialist 
utopians. In fact, many saw the Olympic Village as representing the exact opposite—a 
decimating of Barcelona’s industrial heritage in favor of a new type of city aimed at 
attracting foreign private investment.122 
In 1988, prior to the start of the Games, the Olympic Village came under the 
control of NISA, a public-private company responsible for its construction and sale.123 
NISA was heavily influenced by private real estate developers, who managed to reduce 
the promised number of low-income residences being built. The focus of the project 
turned from the socially-oriented goals of the early 1980s to profit maximization.124 
Although some housing units remained under public control, their reduced prices were 
still too much for most low-income families to afford, and were subsequently taken by 
young professionals instead. As a result, housing prices in surrounding neighborhoods 
began to rise.125 This, along with the erasure of the site’s industrial heritage, attracted 
                                                
122 Illas, Thinking Barcelona, 154-155. 
123 Ingrosso, Barcelona, 72. 
124 Ingrosso, Barcelona, 76. 
125 Casellas, “The Barcelona Model?,” 117-118. 
 43 
criticism. This corruption of social goals at the hands of private actors was to foreshadow 
planning processes in Barcelona in the coming years. 
 The Olympic Village was not the only infrastructure project to invite criticism. 
Despite being praised for its architectural design, the Vall d’Hebron has been condemned 
for its planning strategy, which prioritized the automobile over the street. The result is a 
landscape unfriendly to pedestrians, featuring parking lots, metal sidewalks, and artificial 
turf.126 And although the number of housing units under public control was higher in Vall 
d’Hebron than in Nova Icària, the development still produced gentrification in its 
surrounding neighborhoods.127  
 Gentrification has been the primary negative legacy of Barcelona’s Olympic 
infrastructure projects, which were designed to impress visitors and attract foreign 
investment. Unlike the initiatives of the immediate post-Franco period, Barcelona’s pre-
Games infrastructure schemes targeted a foreign audience while neglecting the city’s own 
residents. The inherently global nature of a mega-event such as the Olympics necessitates 
an international perspective on planning. At the same time, Barcelona’s desire to compete 
in the global marketplace and the service economy forced a new approach to city-
building that was focused more on how the city appeared to private investors than how it 
operated for its own people. 
 This shift in Barcelona’s approach to planning was brought on by the promise of 
the Olympics and the new service economy described by Sassen. However, it was in the 
years following the Games that the approach was concretized and implemented across the 
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city. Projects conducted under this new ideology stood in stark contrast to the initiatives 
of both the post-Franco period and the pre-Games era.  
 
Planning Legacy (Long-Term) 
 Beyond the immediate impact of Olympic infrastructure projects and their post-
Games uses, Barcelona’s planning strategy for the Olympics changed the way the city 
understood itself in the years to come. In the decades following the Games, Barcelona 
relied more and more heavily on private investment to complete infrastructure projects. 
At the same time, the city began to view itself not as an autonomous urban entity within 
Spain, but as a participant in the global competition between cities to attract capital. 
Barcelona understood that in order to achieve its goals in infrastructure improvement, it 
needed to make itself marketable to global investors. However, throughout this process, 
the city’s objectives shifted from improvement for its own residents to improvement for 
the sake of its image. Post-Games infrastructure projects lacked the community-oriented 
goals of earlier initiatives and instead invested private funds in projects that sought to 
generate further capital in a never-ending cycle.128  
 In Kenneth Frampton’s theory of “critical regionalism” cities or architects 
indirectly incorporate local elements into planning or design schemes in an attempt to 
avoid the totalizing effects of globalization.129 This theory is evident in Barcelona’s pre-
Olympic projects that converted old industrial sites into parks, such as the Parc de 
l’Espanya Industrial and the Parc Pegaso, which maintained architectural elements from 
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the factories as references to the city’s industrial heritage.130 These projects were able to 
create new infrastructure that possessed a meaningful link to Barcelona’s cultural and 
economic past. Tourists who experienced these sites could glean some understanding of 
Barcelona’s culture and history. 
 Post-Games planning, however, broke with this theory of critical regionalism. In 
contrast, projects adopted a strategy focused on the creation of images, with less 
emphasis on the authenticity of those images or their truthful relation to the city’s culture 
or history. Taken to the extreme, this conception of planning led the city to become not a 
center for consumption, but an object of consumption itself.131 Jean Clos, the mayor who 
succeeded Pasqual Maragall, forwarded the belief that cities should be promoted like 
businesses.132 One city planner, Manuel de Forn, succinctly summarized this new post-
Games direction: “We have created a new city. Now we need to profit from it.”133 
 Many have cited the Olympic Village project as laying the groundwork for 
Barcelona’s post-Games planning strategy. Its transformation of the Poblenou district 
from an abandoned industrial site into a center of middle-class housing, tourism, and 
commerce represents the city’s bridging of the gap between the industrial economy of the 
past and the new service-sector economy that it sought to embrace.134 So too did it 
represent a crucial aspect of Barcelona’s new planning strategy—the shedding of cultural 
design references in favor of a new tourist-oriented veneer. The infrastructure that results 
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from this process makes little reference to its urban environment or history. It is an empty 
image generated for consumption on the global market. 
 Josep Maria Montaner argues that this erasure of Barcelona’s industrial 
infrastructure, and by extension its industrial history, amounts to an erasure of the city’s 
working-class history.135 The Olympic Village model has now been replicated in the 
Ciutat Vella, notably in the district of El Raval, which has undergone numerous changes 
since the Games. The construction of the Rambla del Raval, a large street and plaza in the 
district, necessitated the demolition of several blocks of buildings. The area has also seen 
the construction of several new museums and a film archive center. A luxury hotel stands 
amidst bars, restaurants, and young tourists.136 The new planning focus on the economy 
of culture and leisure has changed the urban form and social character of El Raval. Rising 
housing prices resulting from these new projects have forced out longtime residents, and 
the rapid pace of construction has contributed to the loss of historic infrastructure.137 El 
Raval represents a significant example of how new post-Games planning processes have 
changed Barcelona. 
 Yet it is the Forum 2004 project that stands as the epitome of planning strategy in 
post-Olympics Barcelona. In 1996, a decade after being awarded the 1992 Olympics, 
Barcelona announced its hosting of the 2004 Forum of Cultures. The event, overseen by 
UNESCO, was a conference intended to facilitate debate on issues such as urbanization, 
sustainability, and globalization.138 The site selected for the event was the Poblenou 
district, the same neighborhood that had undergone the transformations generated by the 
                                                
135 Ingrosso, Barcelona, 96. 
136 Ingrosso, Barcelona, 120. 
137 Ingrosso, Barcelona, 110. 
138 Ingrosso, Barcelona, 99. 
 47 
Olympic Village.139 And just as Oriol Bohigas had supervised the planning of the 
Village, Josep Antoni Acebillo was to oversee the Forum project. The long-term goal of 
the project, beyond simply hosting the conference, was to improve service-sector-related 
infrastructure in that part of the city.140 The vision was decidedly outward-looking, 
seeking to entice global private investment to come to Barcelona. 
 The planning scheme for the Forum expanded on that of the Olympic Village, and 
sought to continue the conversion of disused industrial land into communications and 
information technology facilities. Along with this, housing and park space were also 
incorporated.141 The project, managed by the multinational Hines Group, saw the 
construction of 1400 apartments, three hotels, and three commercial buildings.142 
 While the Forum itself was criticized for its trivialization of cultural diversity and 
its lack of participation, the infrastructure built for the event was condemned as an 
“architectural theme park” that bore no relation to the city beyond. Both the Forum and 
the infrastructure it required were seen as vehicles for the attraction of private investment, 
and nothing more.143 Today, the enormous plaza in front of Herzog & de Meuron’s 
Forum Building stands essentially vacant.144  
 Oriol Bohigas, in seeking to explain the failure of the Forum project, contrasts it 
with his own Olympic Village. He claims that while the Olympic Village aspires to 
continue to urban fabric of the Eixample and allow for social cohesion, the Forum places 
buildings randomly within green space, with no regard for the communal urban 
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experience.145 Acebillo, for his part, defends his work. He says that criticisms which 
attack the space for being unlike the city’s old squares do not understand his intention. 
The infrastructure created for the Forum represents Barcelona’s desire to participate in 
the new service economy, featuring spaces capable of holding conferences and mega-
events. Acebillo sees this acquiescence into the neo-tertiary economy as the only way 
forward, and that those who argue otherwise would rather see the city “grind to a halt.”146   
 The Forum project represents a new way of understanding the city, heavily 
focused on branding the city for an audience of global private investors. And while 
Bohigas may criticize the project in comparison to his own, it is undeniable that the 
Forum project rests on the same logic as that of the Olympic Village. The Village, to 
some extent, began the process of using private investment to fund infrastructure projects. 
And even though, as Bohigas states, the Village aspired to social cohesion, the ultimate 
influence of private agents corrupted this goal. The Forum is a more extreme example of 
this. Its veneer of social and cultural amelioration is even thinner than that of the Olympic 
Village, but the link between the two is irrefutable. 
 Projects like the Forum are taking place within a new planning framework in 
Barcelona. In 2000, the city adopted a plan called 22@Barcelona.147 The plan lays out a 
framework for the conversion of disused industrial lands into new centers for science and 
information technology.148 In many ways, it is a formalized template for what the Forum 
project and the Olympic Village sought to achieve. 22@ focuses on the area of the 
                                                
145 Ingrosso, Barcelona, 86. 
146 Ingrosso, Barcelona, 173, 177. 
147 22@ Barcelona Plan: A Program of Urban, Economic, and Social Transformation 
(Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2012), 2. 
148 22@ Barcelona Plan, 2. 
 49 
Avinguda Diagonal between Placa de les Glories and the Barcelona International 
Convention Center, near the sites of the Forum and Olympic Village.149 Over a twenty-
year period, the plan seeks to replace existing industrial infrastructure with higher density 
construction in order to “generate the critical mass necessary to develop an agglomerative 
economy.”150 This focus on the expansion of service-sector economic facilities is the 
plan’s driving force. 
 As of a 2012 revised version of the plan, 22@ attempts to alleviate criticisms 
centered on the destruction of cultural heritage and historic architecture through the 
Poblenou Industrial Heritage Protection Plan, which intends to protect 114 historic 
structures in the district.151 The Protection Plan considers the reuse of industrial 
infrastructure as schools, offices, or loft apartments to be part of this preservation 
process.152 Yet even so, the plan prioritizes service-sector economic growth and the 
branding of Barcelona for the global market. Given that 22@ is intended to serve as a 
guiding framework for future planning in Barcelona, the ideological shift is clear. The 
focus is now, more than ever, on the attraction of private capital through leisure- and 
technology-based improvements to the city’s infrastructure. Post-Games infrastructure 
projects have sought to construct a brand identity for Barcelona, casting the city as, not 
simply a center for culture, leisure, and commerce, but as an object of consumption itself. 
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Discussion/Conclusion 
 Since the end of Francoism in 1975, urban planning in Barcelona has always been 
related in some way to culture. The early projects of the late 1970s and early 1980s were 
small urban interventions that centered on the improvement of public space through art 
installations. The goal of these projects was to improve the city for its own residents. 
Without much funding, these initiatives were small in scope and driven by the public 
sector. Yet despite the modesty of these interventions, planners like Oriol Bohigas 
believed that if located in the right neighborhoods, they could induce urban change on a 
wider scale and bring a sense of vibrancy to neighborhoods which had been neglected for 
decades under Franco. 
 This frugal yet intentional planning ideology became Barcelona’s trademark. Yet 
the city still believed that more widespread urban improvements could be made with 
more funding. To this end, Barcelona sought, and won, the right to host the 1992 Summer 
Olympics. With the promise of the Olympics, the city acquired more funding, especially 
through private investment. The enormity of the Games necessitated urban interventions 
of a much larger scale than previous projects. At the same time, the Olympics forced the 
city into the global economy, which over the previous decade had shifted its focus toward 
services and the realm of culture and leisure. The resulting infrastructure Barcelona built 
for the Games represented a change from its post-Franco era planning ideology. The city 
adopted a global stance on development projects, viewing the Games as an opportunity to 
market itself to international private investment. Barcelona’s priority became the 
attraction of capital through the creation of infrastructure related to the service sector. At 
the same time, considerations such as the preservation of historic infrastructure became 
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less important. This is seen most evidently in the Olympic Village project, which sought 
to replace old industrial sites with middle- and upper-class housing, as well as spaces for 
commerce and consumption. In the years leading up to the Games, planning focused 
increasingly on the marketing of Barcelona as a tourist destination, using culture 
primarily as a branding tool. 
 Following the Games, this trend continued and intensified. The increasing 
influence of private agents in the planning process meant that infrastructure built in the 
city bore less and less relation to actual Barcelonans. The goal of attracting foreign 
capital overshadowed all else, giving rise to projects like the Forum. Seen as a more 
corrupted version of the Olympic Village, the Forum project represented the epitome of 
Barcelona’s post-Games planning strategy. The rhetoric of cultural diversity surrounding 
the Forum event was a thin veneer masking the true intention to attract private capital. 
The infrastructure created for the event barely related to the city or its people and today 
stands as abandoned as the factories it replaced. New planning frameworks such as 22@ 
serve as guidelines for this process, and though they attempt to make provisions for the 
preservation of culturally-significant infrastructure, do so only superficially; industrial 
architecture is incorporated if it can be used to build profitable loft apartments. City 
planning in Barcelona is now oriented toward the construction of service sector 
infrastructure. The city is no longer a center for commerce; it is itself a commercial. 
 Culture has consistently played a role in Barcelona’s post-1975 planning history. 
The publicly driven, small-scale interventions of the early years saw culture as something 
tangible, something that could be used to truly improve the city for its own people. But 
with the increasingly global outlook engendered by the Olympics and sustained by the 
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new service economy, Barcelona began to view culture as a branding strategy. The 
naming of Nova Icària for a group of socialists while the Village represents everything 
but socialism shows the irony of the way in which pre-Games planning used the city’s 
cultural heritage as a branding mechanism for a global audience. After the Olympics, 
Barcelona took this strategy even further, shedding all references to the city’s culture 
except in instances where it could be profitable. The result is a strategy centered on the 
tourist—all image and no authenticity. And while the city today retains a significant 
amount of culturally relevant infrastructure and historical references, its current planning 
schemes do not indicate a continued valuation of this. 
 Yet even so, many have cited Barcelona’s Olympic planning to have been a 
success. And in the following years, cities sought to emulate the alleged ‘Barcelona 
model.’ One notable city that attempted to do this was Athens in 2004. 
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Chapter Four 
Case Study: Athens 2004 
 
 
 Twelve years after the Barcelona Olympics, the city of Athens attempted to 
replicate the alleged model of the 1992 Games. Itself a Mediterranean port city, Athens 
hoped it too could use the Olympics to improve its failing infrastructure and rebrand itself 
as a modern tourist destination. But though the city proclaimed its adherence to the 
Barcelona model, directed action did not follow. In essence, the ‘Athens model’ 
contained even less substance than the Barcelona one. 
  The prevailing municipal legacy of the 2004 Olympics is one of budgets 
exceeded and construction deadlines unmet. It is also one of planning bureaucracy and 
abandoned facilities. Athens’ lack of a long-term planning vision, compared with the 
intentionality of Barcelona’s strategy, accounts for some of these perceived 
shortcomings. But to fully understand the legacy of the 2004 Olympics, it is crucial to 
locate the Games within the framework of the global economy and the increasingly 
dominant service sector. Much like the Barcelona Olympics, the Athens Games 
highlighted the need for cities to compete with each other for global capital. The 
sustained future of a city, perhaps even more so than in 1992, rested on the attraction of 
global private investment. In Athens 2004, much as in Barcelona, the service sector—
specifically the economy of culture and leisure—was recognized as the gateway into the 
global marketplace. The Olympics, again, were seen as the means by which to enter. 
However, the unique planning history of Athens produced a similarly unique 
Olympic planning process and subsequent legacy. While public initiatives largely seemed 
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to fail, spontaneous growth in privately driven economic nodes prevailed. This chapter 
explores the planning process and legacy of the 2004 Olympics.  
 
Athens’ Planning History 
 The city of Athens has a long history of urban development reaching back to 
Ancient Greece. And while many of its archaeological sites and infrastructure from this 
era have remained important factors in city planning, more recent 20th century planning 
has also influenced the design of Olympic and present-day Athens.  
By far the most important city in Greece, Athens is a peripheral city in the wider 
context of Europe, and is today plagued by unplanned growth, traffic congestion, and 
obsolete infrastructure.153 In the 1950s and 1960s, the city experienced enormous 
population growth and was forced to build new housing. The antiparochi system was 
developed, whereby an owner provides land, prospective tenants contribute money, and a 
builder constructs the housing. In most cases, no architects were involved and the result 
for the city is a nearly uniform landscape of five- and six-story apartments of 
unremarkable design. Many buildings feature partial upper floors because unfinished 
buildings are taxed at a lower rate than completed ones.154 Because the pace of 
construction was so rapid, water and sewage systems lagged behind.155 
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In the 1970s and 1980s, Athens experienced uneven economic development due 
in part to an influx of immigrants from the countryside into the city.156 Unplanned 
developments on the urban fringe, which had previously been tolerated in light of 
housing shortages, continued to be accepted because their construction aided the 
economy and created jobs.157 By the 1980s, Athens’ present-day urban form was taking 
shape: a high-density urban center with inefficient land use on the periphery and changes 
to the area’s natural topography.158 The 1985 Athens Regulatory Master Plan was created 
to address these issues, but the overlapping influence of other administrative bodies, as 
well as the dearth of systems that track land use changes, impeded the successful 
implementation of the Master Plan.159 
Seeking to remedy these issues with the city’s infrastructure, Athens assembled a 
bid for its second Olympics between 1987 and 1990. The city believed that hosting the 
Games would help stimulate a struggling economy and renew failing infrastructure.160 
Athens sought the 1996 Summer Olympics and, in the wake of the 1984 Los Angeles 
Games, hoped to ground the increasingly commercialized Games in their traditional 
geographic roots.161 But Athens’ bid for the 1996 Games failed, and in doing so defeated 
the city’s nostalgic outlook on the Olympics.162  
                                                
156 David Goldblatt, The Games: A Global History of the Olympics (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2016), 381. 
157 I. Chorianopoulos et al., “Planning, Competitiveness and Sprawl in the Mediterranean 
City: The Case of Athens,” Cities 27 (2010): 252. 
158 Chorianopoulos et al., “Planning, Competitiveness and Sprawl,” 251. 
159 Chorianopoulos et al., “Planning, Competitiveness and Sprawl,” 251-252. 
160 Margaret M. Gold, “Athens 2004,” in Olympic Cities: City Agendas, Planning and the 
World’s Games, 1896-2016, ed. John R. Gold and Margaret M. Gold (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 317. 
161 Gold, “Athens 2004,” 318. 
162 Gold, “Athens 2004,” 319. 
 56 
 Ironically, among the reasons for Athens’ rejection was the city’s failing 
infrastructure and lack of facilities—the very problems it believed the Olympics would 
help solve.163 Yet the city was not deterred. By the turn of the 21st century, Athens was 
experiencing social and environmental tensions as a result of its urban form. Unplanned 
developments at its periphery necessitated automobile use, which in turn created 
congestion in the high-density urban center. Since Athens’ bid a decade earlier, the 
Barcelona Olympics of 1992 had renewed faith in the Games’ ability to improve 
infrastructure and stimulate economic development, and Athens again sought to host the 
Olympics. In January 1996, with a few modifications, the Hellenic Olympic Committee 
and the Mayor of Athens submitted a second bid to host the Games.164  
The new bid focused more on a pragmatic approach to hosting the Olympics, in 
contrast to the earlier bid’s insistence on Greece’s “right” to receive the centennial 
Games.165 With a more stable framework in place, Gianna Angelopoulos, who headed 
Athens’ Olympic effort, promised to “give the world the Olympics of their dreams.”166  
 And in September 1997, Athens was awarded the 2004 Olympic Games.167  
 
Planning for the Games 
 The final planning scheme developed by Athens for the 2004 Games, while 
aspiring to the purported standard of urban coherence set forth by Barcelona, lacked the 
intentionality of the 1992 Olympic strategy. Though the plan initially centralized 
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infrastructure in a few sites, changes were made in 1998 that sought to avoid problems 
that might arise due to existing zoning rules.168 As a result, the final scheme for the 
Games adopted a more scattered model, locating infrastructure across a wider range of 
the city.169 The building of Olympic infrastructure also marked an important moment 
where a new planning ideology was beginning to form. Much as in Barcelona, Olympic 
planning in Athens saw the prioritization of the service sector economy. Athens, like 
Barcelona, sought to improve its culture- and leisure-related infrastructure. However, 
because Athens lacked the strong underlying planning framework that was present in 
Barcelona, the result was an even more fragmented design scheme and, ultimately, city.  
 The primary Olympic site was the Athens Olympic Sports Complex (AOSC) 
located at Maroussi, nine kilometers north of the central city. Using some existing 
facilities, the AOSC housed the Olympic Stadium, the velodrome, the swimming 
complex, and the press center, among other things.170 The AOSC, as the main Olympic 
site, represented the city’s aspirations toward the development of its culture and leisure 
infrastructure. In trying to replicate the legacy of the Barcelona Games, Athens 
commissioned Spanish architect Santiago Calatrava to design the AOSC.171 Calatrava, 
who had built one of the controversial telecommunications towers for the 1992 Games, 
devised a similarly dramatic design for the Athens Olympic complex. Calatrava’s scheme 
prominently featured arches, which the architect initially attributed to the arc of a javelin 
throw or a long jump. 
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Figure 6: The AOSC, designed by Santiago Calatrava.172 
  
 
But after criticism of his design on the part of Greeks and Athenians, Calatrava 
adjusted his rationale, claiming the arches paid homage to the Greek architectural 
tradition. Similarly, the reasoning for Calatrava’s use of blue and white coloration 
changed from a representation of sky and sea to that of the Greek flag.173 These shifts in 
rhetoric are symbolic of Athens’ increasing focus on tourism and the service economy. 
Calatrava’s initial inspirations for his design were too ambiguous and thus did not 
provide a decent opportunity to culturally brand Athens. By tying the infrastructure of the 
Games to the culture of the city and the country, Athens sought to commodify its culture 
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and ultimately profit from tourism. The Olympics were here seen as the linchpin between 
culture and profit. 
 The Faliro Bay site was another important Olympic area in Athens. The design of 
the site was overseen by French architects Reichen & Robert and was intended to 
increase pedestrian access to the waterfront.174 Cut off from the city by a coastal 
highway, Faliro had essentially become a dumping ground for the city. Though it was 
originally intended to host eleven sports, this number was ultimately reduced to four.175 
Nevertheless, infrastructural interventions were made, including the renovation of both 
Peace and Friendship Stadium and Karaiskaki Stadium. Additionally, an existing 
racetrack was moved and the Illissos River was canalized to prevent flooding.176   
 The renovation of the old Helleniki Airport provided another Olympic site. The 
airport hosted fencing, baseball, basketball, hockey, softball, canoeing, and kayaking in 
converted hangars and newly-built facilities.177 Near Mount Parnitha was built the 
Olympic Village. Before it was constructed, the Village promised to implement an 
environmentally-conscious design strategy, using solar energy, indigenous plant species, 
and special water management systems. However, none of these strategies were realized 
and as a result the Village attracted a fair amount of criticism.178  
 The scattered planning strategy for Athens’ Olympic infrastructure was mirrored 
by the lack of an overarching design aesthetic. One newspaper article wrote, “Unlike 
Barcelona…there is little sense of an underlying design culture in Athens, and the  
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Figure 6: Distribution of primary Olympic sites in Athens:  
1) Olympic Village, 2) AOSC, 3) Faliro Bay, 4) Helleniki Airport. 
(Source map from Google Earth, modified by the author using Photoshop). 
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numerous interventions seem at times like incongruous accessories pinned to the 
languishing body of an intransigent giant.”179 Though Athens aspired to the design 
quality of Barcelona, its lack of strategic coordination resulted in arbitrarily implemented 
infrastructure.  
 In addition to infrastructure directly related to the Games, Athens also further 
developed its transport infrastructure. The city built new highways and ring roads that 
extended out into the suburbs. Athens also doubled the size of its metro system, adding 
eleven new miles and twenty-one new stations, and built the new Venizelos Airport 
outside the city.180 New, more environmentally-friendly and accessible buses replaced the 
old fleet.181  
 Other infrastructure-related projects focused on the renovation of the city’s 
historic sites. Athens’ archaeological attractions were linked together with new green 
spaces and pedestrian paths.182 The idea was to create a unique tourist spectacle that 
simultaneously referenced the city’s cultural heritage and projected the image of a 
modernized Athens. The city was seeking to make its history marketable, and the 2004 
Olympics acted as the pivot for this ideology. 
 Other ‘beautification’ projects conducted for the 2004 Games involved the 
installation of more street and monument lighting, the restoration of building facades, 
landscaping, street paving, and the renovation of public squares.183 These interventions 
were primarily for aesthetic purposes, seeking to improve the city’s image but without 
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much regard for its content. In fact, much of the ideology surrounding the planning of 
infrastructure for the Games involved improving the city’s marketability in the culture 
and leisure sectors of the economy. The construction of sports arenas and convention 
centers, as well as the renovation of the waterfront and several museums, represented 
projects which ultimately sought to connect Athens to the service economy and global 
private capital. Much as in Barcelona, this planning of service-based infrastructure 
involved the commodification of Athens’ unique culture. The showcasing of the city’s 
historic sites for a global audience of tourists and private investors is a prime example of 
this, and such processes would continue after the Games were over.  
 In discussing the breakdown of investment for the 2004 Games, Elias Beriatos 
and Aspa Gospodini classify Olympic infrastructure projects into three categories: built 
heritage, innovative design, and non-competitive. Built heritage projects focus on the 
historic center of Athens, and include the linking of archaeological sites and the 
restoration of monuments, squares, and historic buildings. Innovative design projects are 
those featuring high-profile designers and architects, such as Calatrava’s AOSC and the 
Faliro Bay waterfront redevelopment competition. Non-competitive projects include all 
else, ranging from transport infrastructure to new street furniture. Beriatos and Gospodini 
estimate that built heritage projects accounted for approximately 4.89% of total 
investment, innovative design projects about 60.53%, and non-competitive projects 
34.58%.184 About 65% of total investment in infrastructure went toward what Beriatos 
and Gospodini term “competitive projects,” which are essentially those aimed at the 
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attraction of global capital. The competition, as Sassen describes, is understood to be 
between other European and global cities.  
 
Infrastructural Legacy (Short-Term) 
 The most immediate legacy of Athens’ Olympic infrastructure is one of 
abandonment. In stark contrast to Barcelona, most of whose Olympic venues found post-
Games uses, Athens was unable to effectively utilize much of the infrastructure it had 
built for the Games. Directly following the Games, bid organizer Gianna Angelopoulos 
predicted that Athens’ sports facilities would “host regional, European and world 
championships—as well as local Greek teams and clubs and many cultural events as 
well.”185 However, pre-Games planning for the 2004 Olympics had not emphasized long-
term strategies for infrastructure use as the 1992 Games had done, and as a result, venues 
have had to find sporadic and sometimes unconventional roles to play. 
Part of the problem also stems from the scattered placement of these venues. 
Olympic infrastructure situated far from the city center is difficult to access, and many of 
those sites have not been activated in the way that was hoped.186 Additional issues have 
resulted from political infighting. The New Democracy Party, which assumed power in 
March 2004, blamed the oppositional socialist PASOK for having no post-Games plan 
for the infrastructure. Meanwhile, PASOK accused the New Democracy of allowing 
venues to deteriorate.187 In response, the New Democracy created Hellenic Olympic 
Properties, a state-owned holding company, and transferred ownership of twenty-two 
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venues including all sports facilities, the press center, and the Olympic Village. The plan 
was for HOP to oversee the venues until lessees could be found, but the maintenance 
costs of much of the infrastructure is too high to be worth it.188  
 
Figure 6: Abandoned facilities at Faliro Bay.189 
 
 
 
 
 Despite these setbacks, some Olympic venues have found alternative post-Games 
uses. For the most part, these post-Games uses have followed the lead of pre-Games 
planning ideology, and have secured roles in the culture and leisure economy. The 
Badminton Hall, for example, was opened in 2007 as a 2,500-seat theater, the largest in 
Greece. The Stavros Niarchios Foundation Cultural Center was built on the site of the old 
racecourse at Faliro Bay. The International Broadcasting Center was renovated to become 
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a shopping mall.190 These new uses represent the growing influence of the private sector, 
taking advantage of Athens’ lack of post-Games strategy. They also symbolize the 
significance of the service sector and the economy of culture and leisure. Though the city 
itself was unable to orchestrate a coherent post-Games strategy for its Olympic 
infrastructure, Athens’ focus on the economy of culture and leisure in the initial planning 
process left remnants suitable for private agents to pick through after the Games were 
over. 
 Still, however, much of Athens’ Olympic infrastructure remains abandoned. The 
main Olympic complex lies vacant, thieves having stripped the site of valuable 
materials.191 For sports that are unpopular in Greece, finding new uses for venues has 
been challenging. The Hellenikon Complex has recently become an improvised refugee 
camp for Afghan migrants.192 
 As in Barcelona, the Athens Olympic Village stands in many ways as singular 
representation of the city’s Olympic legacy as a whole. The Village, which was initially 
promised to be a piece of highly sustainable infrastructure, ultimately failed to implement 
many of the energy-saving measures it had intended to. There were other concerns too. 
Even before the Games, many Athenians protested the construction of the Olympic 
Village, believing it would worsen congestion in the city and noting that it would 
encroach on forested land.193 After the Games, a lottery was held for low-income families 
to acquire housing in the Village. However, this process left 90% of the apartments 
                                                
190 Gold, “Athens 2004,” 333-335. 
191 Goldblatt, The Games, 386. 
192 Dove Barbanel, “For Migrants, An Olympic Village in Ruins,” New York Times, 
August 11, 2016. 
193 Helen Jefferson Lenskyj and Stephen Wagg, ed., The Palgrave Handbook of Olympic 
Studies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 169. 
 66 
occupied by individuals suffering from serious poverty or mental or physical health 
issues. As of 2015, the unemployment rate in the Olympic Village was 60%. High 
property taxes have also forced shops and schools in the district to shut down.194 Other 
criticisms have centered on the lack of public transport connection to the area.195 While 
some see the provision of housing in general as a benefit of the Olympic Village, others 
point out these issues as evidence that Athens’ lack of post-Games strategy has harmed 
the city. 
 Many have seen the failures of Athens’ immediate post-Games infrastructural 
legacy as stemming from a dissonance between the government and the city’s residents. 
The city government’s rhetoric of national pride belied an absence of citizen participation 
in Olympic planning and decision-making processes—an absence itself caused by missed 
deadlines and the rushed nature of construction.196  
 Some have sought to outline an ‘Athens model’ in order to contrast the alleged 
failures of the 2004 Games with the alleged successes of the 1992 Games. Whereas the 
Barcelona model concentrated Olympic interventions in four urban critical areas, the 
Athens model scattered infrastructure across the city. Whereas the Barcelona model 
focused on the redevelopment of Brownfield sites, the Athens model instead built on 
Greenfields and undeveloped lands. Whereas the Barcelona model intimately involved 
architects and planners who emphasized good urban form, the Athens model largely 
neglected design professionals. When architects were consulted, such as Calatrava with 
the AOSC, their work was considered only in isolation and not seen in the wider urban 
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context of the city as a whole. The major similarity between the two models, however, is 
the significance placed on the culture and leisure economy. In both Barcelona and 
Athens, infrastructure designed and built for the Games was intended to play an 
important role in the service sector. 
 While the prevailing discourse regarding the legacy of Athens’ Olympic 
infrastructure is one of disuse, abandonment, and lack of foresight, there are in fact 
subtler ways in which Athens’ venues have endured in the post-Games era. Still, what 
uses that have been found have centered on the service sector and the culture and leisure 
economy. The reopening of Olympic venues as malls and museums, though not 
necessarily part of the city’s initial infrastructural scheme, falls in line with overarching 
pre-Games planning ideology. The focus on the development of Athens’ culture and 
leisure infrastructure in the planning process carried over into the post-Games era, which 
found the city searching for private investors to repurpose expensive and unused venues. 
Given the strong emphasis on culture and leisure in the construction of these venues, and 
in the Olympic planning process as a whole, it seems inevitable that most of these new 
uses would involve the service economy directly. 
 The patchwork nature of Athens’ post-Olympic infrastructural legacy underscores 
a similar fragmentation of the city at a larger scale. In the years following the 2004 
Games, Athens experienced increasing urban degeneration, brought on in part by the 
service sector focus of the Olympic planning process. 
 
 
 
 68 
Planning Legacy (Long-Term) 
 The planning legacy bequeathed to the city by the 2004 Games is difficult to fully 
evaluate. Compared to the 1992 Games, a short amount of time has elapsed since the 
Olympics themselves, and less has been published regarding the effects the Athens 
Games have had on city planning. There are, however, some overall trends that have been 
made apparent.  
One of the most salient themes in Athens has been the increasing fragmentation of 
the city’s urban fabric, as a result of both public and private forces. The lack of 
coordination amongst the city’s various publicly planned Olympic sites has resulted in 
the inability to cohesively plan for and implement post-Games uses. This process has in 
turn been mirrored by the proliferation of privately driven economic clusters in key 
locations within the city. These clusters have, in the view of some, “exacerbated physical 
and social fragmentation in the city.”197 In the formation of these clusters, the generation 
of jobs has been prioritized over the social and economic equality of the neighborhood. In 
effect, an individual’s inclusion and role in this new type of urban environment is 
dependent on their relation to the economy.198 Aspa Gospodini identifies four types of 
these clusters: entrepreneurial epicenters, high-culture epicenters, popular leisure 
epicenters, and culture and leisure waterfront epicenters.199 All four types relate directly 
to the service economy. 
Though the development of these clusters parallels the planning and 
implementation of infrastructure for the 2004 Olympics, Gospodini makes certain to 
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differentiate between public initiatives centered on the Games and the privately driven 
formation of culture-based economic nodes. She characterizes public sites as those 
related directly to the 2004 Olympics (such as athletic complexes), as well as parks, 
convention centers, and spaces of commerce, all of which contribute to the service sector 
of the economy.200 The scattering of these sites across the city indicates a multinuclear 
approach to planning. Privately generated sites, on the other hand, are clustered in the 
city center. Gospodini sees these nodes as being unplanned manifestations of the culture 
and leisure economy.201 In many cases, as in Barcelona, they represent the conversion of 
disused industrial lands into spaces of leisure, such as nightclubs, galleries, and 
theaters.202 These nodes of culture and leisure, more than the publicly planned 
infrastructure of the Olympics, exist today as active sites of economic and cultural 
interaction. Gospodini identifies four of these privately driven sites within the city of 
Athens: Piraeus Avenue, Psiri, Metaxourgio, and Kifissias Avenue. Each is briefly 
discussed in turn. 
Piraeus Avenue was created in 1835 as an industrial thoroughfare between Athens 
and the neighboring port city of Piraeus. During a period of deindustrialization in the 
1970s, factories along the avenue were abandoned. Those that remained were ultimately 
protected by the 1986 city master plan, and began to be converted for new uses. Culture- 
and leisure-based activities occupied the converted buildings, which attracted private 
investors due to their low prices and accessible location. Today, the Piraeus Avenue 
                                                
200 Gospodini, “Post-Industrial Trajectories,” 1165. 
201 Gospodini, “Post-Industrial Trajectories,” 1167. 
202 Gospodini, “Post-Industrial Trajectories,” 1172. 
 70 
district is characterized by a number of high-culture institutions stitched together by bars 
and nightclubs.203 
Psiri and Metaxourgio were created in the mid-19th century as working-class 
neighborhoods, characterized by their large numbers of small, family-owned businesses. 
By the end of the 19th century, there was a greater mixture of residential and industrial 
uses. But deindustrialization during the 1970s caused the two neighborhoods to 
deteriorate. This process was worsened by increasing traffic congestion and pollution, as 
well as restrictions on new construction. An influx of immigrants and middle-class 
residents in the 1990s, along with the city’s 1991 Regeneration Plan, aided in the 
economic stimulation of the two areas. The restoration of old homes and the conversion 
of former industrial buildings into design offices and galleries symbolize the embrace of 
the service sector in these districts. Today, the two neighborhoods feature economic 
activities related to leisure, nightlife, high culture, commerce, and services.204  
Kifissias Avenue was built in the 19th century to connect central Athens with 
regions to the north. Properties along this route were larger than in other areas of the city, 
and in the 20th century large office complexes were built along the mid-section of the 
avenue. Knowledge-based companies and financial services were attracted to this area, 
which has become increasingly commercialized. Prior to the 1990s, the region was 
characterized by housing and commerce. Now, there are banks, insurance companies, 
telecommunications providers, and electronics companies. The AOSC was built in the 
Kifissias Avenue area for the 2004 Olympic Games.205 Unlike the other privately 
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developed areas Gospodini identifies, Kifissias Avenue has no history of postindustrial 
decline. It instead represents an alternative route for the investment of private capital into 
service sector economic activities, where information technology companies build their 
own infrastructure from scratch. Kifissias Avenue may well be a predictor for future 
developments in Athens and similar cities with service-sector-focused economies. 
It is important to note that these sites have not developed directly due to the 
Olympics, and many have been developing their culture and leisure infrastructure since 
before the Games were being planned. The point is not that these economic nodes have 
developed because of the Games, but rather in spite of them. Their existence, and 
persistence, provides a counterpoint to the planning of the Olympic era, demonstrating 
that private forces exert a much greater influence over the infrastructural development of 
the city than public ones. Gospodini notes,  
“On the one hand, spontaneous entrepreneurial clusters like Kifissias 
Avenue, representing robust post-industrial economic formation, are 
consigned by local authorities and the state to a laissez-faire spatial 
development programme and conventional architectural schemes. On the 
other hand, planned epicentres of culture and leisure involving huge public 
funds, like those constructed for the 2004 Olympics, have failed to shape a 
new quarter of culture and leisure in the city’s landscape, since they have 
been scattered throughout Attica.”206 
 
 This is the crucial legacy of the 2004 Olympics. If the city is to understand how 
to successfully plan for its future infrastructure, it must recognize the relative failures of 
its own Olympic program and the relative successes of self-generated, privately 
developed economic nodes.  
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Discussion/Conclusion 
The Athens Games of 2004 occupy an important moment in the history of 
Olympic planning. The 2004 Games in many ways demonstrated the impossibility of 
replicating the so-called ‘Barcelona model’ and showcased the overwhelming power of 
the private sector in the generation of infrastructure related to the service economy.  
Publicly driven planning for the 2004 Games was perhaps incoherent from the 
outset. A lack of clear post-Games strategy, worsened by the scattered distribution of 
venues, resulted in a large degree of abandonment and disuse. What little pre-Games 
planning focus there was centered on the city’s development of its culture and leisure 
infrastructure, and the venues that have found post-Games uses have achieved this within 
the culture and leisure economy. 
But the greatest amount of development has come from the private sector. Self-
generated economic nodes have spawned alongside the Olympics, and have for the most 
part thrived in the post-Games era. While the AOSC lies vacant, Piraeus Avenue bustles. 
These privately generated sites have, to some extent, followed a key tenet of the 
Barcelona model, which is the redevelopment of disused industrial lands. Meanwhile 
public planning initiatives largely neglected to do this. 
In both realms, public and private, the issue of fragmentation still exists. The 
spatially dispersed nature of Athens’ Olympic infrastructure, combined with the city’s 
lack of a clear post-Games plan, has resulted in further urban incoherence and social 
inequality. Seemingly positive strategies, such as the allocation of housing in the 
Olympic Village to low-income families, have proven disastrous. The city’s paramount 
focus on building infrastructure suited to the culture and leisure economy has left venues 
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either abandoned or repurposed at the hands of private investors with little concern for 
Athens’ urban dwellers. Unplanned, privately driven cultural clusters have likewise 
prioritized economic development at the cost of all else. 
 The 2004 Games represent an irony of planning for Athens. While the city 
government touted the benefits of the so-called Barcelona model and sought to emulate it, 
public planning for the Games instead chased private investment haphazardly. Neglecting 
many of the fundamental tenets of Barcelona’s strategy and unable to rely on a strong 
planning history of its own, Athens’ Olympic scheme was scattered and confused, and 
ultimately failed. Meanwhile, private forces in the city, acting on their own, more closely 
followed certain aspects of the Barcelona model and have found relative economic 
success. Yet, both public and private forces have contributed to increasing urban 
fragmentation and, like Barcelona, the commodification of the city.  
Ultimately, the Athens Games have forced cities to reckon with the fact that they 
are no longer in control of planning and infrastructure development. Cites have not only 
become enticed by the potential profits of the new service economy described by Sassen, 
and thus beholden to it, but private forces now play a significantly more powerful role in 
infrastructure development than the municipal governments themselves. The Athens 
Games have shown this to be the case. 
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Chapter Five 
Olympic Planning in the Present Day 
 
 
 The 1992 and 2004 Olympics represent unique historical episodes. Each resides at 
the intersection of two complex histories: one of the Olympics themselves, and one of the 
individual cities in which the Games were staged. The peculiarities of planning as well as 
the complicated legacies of each staging of the Olympics are the product of these two 
histories. But each city’s Olympic legacy is also the result of more widespread forces of 
globalization that affect all cities, not just those that host the Games. This chapter will 
provide a summary and comparison of both the 1992 and 2004 Olympics, seeking to 
identify points of concordance and divergence in each staging of the Games. Then, the 
Games will be placed within a theoretical framework of globalization, relying on the 
work of Saskia Sassen to help describe some of the forces that have recently been 
shaping world cities. Finally, a brief discussion of the current state of the Olympics and 
the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Games will look toward the future of Olympic planning. 
 
Comparing the 1992 and 2004 Games 
 The 1992 and 2004 Olympics here are compared according to the four analytical 
headings outlined in each case study chapter: planning history, planning for the Games, 
infrastructural legacy (short-term), and planning legacy (long-term). 
 Recent planning history in Barcelona begins with the mid-19th century 
implementation of the Eixample. The Eixample’s strategy, which emphasized green 
space and aspired to social equity, stood in stark contrast to the Haussmann-style renewal 
occurring in other European cities at the time. Under Franco, city planning initiatives 
 75 
essentially ceased. But after Franco’s death in 1975, planning resumed in the form of the 
PGM. The plan, much like the Eixample, sought to create new green spaces in the city 
with the goal of improving the urban experiences of its residents. But the PGM also 
introduced a new concept—that of repurposing brownfield sites. Deindustrialization 
under Franco had produced abandoned industrial sites along Barcelona’s waterfront, and 
the PGM intended to find new uses for these properties. 
 The appointment of Oriol Bohigas to Head of Urban Planning coincided with 
economic decline in Europe, and Barcelona’s planning strategy moved to focus on small-
scale, publicly driven interventions. As with prior planning initiatives in Barcelona, these 
interventions centered on the creation of public space for those who lived in the city. 
During the early part of the 1980s, hundreds of small parks and public spaces were 
created. At the same time, mayor Narcís Serra and his successor Pasqual Maragall began 
to look outward, seeking more money to fund larger infrastructure projects. In 1986, this 
desire was satisfied with the awarding of the 1992 Olympics to Barcelona. 
 From the mid-1800s until 1986, Barcelona’s planning ideology remained, at its 
core, unchanged. Plans such as the Eixample, the PGM, and the interventions conducted 
under Bohigas represented a focus on the creation of public space for those who inhabited 
the city. The primary goal was to improve the city for its own residents. Additionally, 
these schemes were driven by the public sector. With the exception of the Franco era, a 
certain continuity can be traced throughout Barcelona’s planning history from the 
Eixample in the mid-19th century to the awarding of the Olympic Games in 1986. It is 
crucial to recognize this continuity as a foundation for the planning of Olympic 
infrastructure between 1986 and 1992. 
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 Athens’ pre-Games planning history looks quite different. The city, like 
Barcelona, has a long history of planning dating back to ancient Greece. However, the 
most significant recent history concerns the city’s response to the enormous population 
growth of the 1950s and 1960s with the antiparochi system. This system, designed to 
fund and build housing as quickly as possible, resulted in the rapid proliferation of nearly 
identical apartment buildings throughout Athens. Because of the speed with which the 
housing was constructed, design professionals were not consulted and sewage systems 
were not always completed. In contrast to the carefully planned, resident-oriented 
schemes of Barcelona, city planning in Athens prioritized efficiency and speed. 
 The 1970s and 1980s in Athens were marked by unplanned developments at the 
periphery of the city and the failure to implement the 1985 Regulatory Master Plan. By 
the end of the 1980s, Athens’s history of unchecked development had produced a high-
density urban center with inefficient land use at the fringe. Struggling with congestion 
and deteriorating infrastructure, the city bid for the 1996 Games and lost. However, a 
resubmission for the 2004 Games was ultimately successful. 
 In contrast to the publicly driven schemes that characterize Barcelona’s planning 
history, few unified efforts at controlling urban infrastructural development in Athens 
were made during the 20th century. And those plans that were created, such as the 1985 
Regulatory Master Plan, were not met with a high degree of success.  
These histories are critical to understanding the development of Olympic 
infrastructure as well as the subsequent legacies in each city. Barcelona, unlike Athens, 
had a long history of publicly oriented planning initiatives on which to rely, and this 
would, to some extent, dictate the outcome of its Olympic infrastructure projects. 
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Olympic planning in Barcelona differed from pre-Games methods due to the 
increased scale at which projects needed to be built. Yet at the same time, the city relied 
on similar strategies to those of the pre-Games years, containing the majority of 
infrastructural developments within four core sites. It was hoped that by intervening in 
these four critically located sites (Montjuïc, Vall d’Hebron, Diagonal, and Poblenou), the 
regenerative effects of new development would emanate throughout the city. This 
strategy falls very much in line with Bohigas’ pre-Games city planning methods in 
Barcelona, which operated under the assumption that small-scale interventions in specific 
locations could produce widespread positive effects. The link between the two planning 
ideologies is clear. 
 Nevertheless, the enormous scale of the Games proved to be a transformative 
factor. Small-scale pre-Games projects that focused on the redevelopment of industrial 
land now amounted to the razing and reconstruction of entire neighborhoods, as shown in 
Poblenou. The scale of the Olympics also forced a shift in the target audience of 
infrastructure projects. While pre-Games initiatives aimed at improving the social 
environment of the city for its own residents, projects built for the Olympics sought to 
impress a global audience, ultimately hoping to attract private investment, specifically in 
the service sector. These changes in planning ideology, brought on by the hosting of the 
Olympics, laid the foundation for the increasing influence of private agents in the city’s 
planning processes. 
 In contrast to Barcelona, the Athens Games adopted a more scattered model for 
the laying out of Olympic infrastructure across the city. In standing with the city’s pre-
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Games planning methods, Athens did not involve architects or designers in much of the 
Olympic planning process. The exception is Calatrava, author of the controversial 
telecommunications tower of the 1992 Games. Barcelona, on the other hand, relied 
heavily on design professionals during its Olympic planning process, and as a result, the 
city was able to develop infrastructure well suited to the attraction of global capital. 
Athens, too, sought capital investment, focusing, as Barcelona had, on the attraction of 
the service sector for economic growth. Beautification projects in the city focused on the 
marketing of Athens’ unique cultural heritage. 
  
 The immediate infrastructural legacy of the 1992 Olympics is considered to be a 
largely positive one. Media praised the city for its redevelopment of disused industrial 
sites and critics lauded the integration of the Olympic scheme with long-term planning 
strategies in the city. Notably, most of the venues built for the Barcelona Games were 
able to find post-Olympic uses. However, these appraisals masked some of the more 
negative effects of the city’s strategy. Enormous redevelopment schemes, such as the one 
for Poblenou, forced longtime residents and businesses out of their districts. The Olympic 
Village in Poblenou has also drawn criticism for its absolute decimation of industrial 
infrastructure, which some have seen as equivalent to the destruction of part of the city’s 
architectural heritage. 
 The increasing control of private agents has also been a negative consequence of 
the Barcelona Olympic strategy. These private developers, rather than focus on the 
improvement of the city’s social environments, instead prioritize profit maximization. 
This, along with pedestrian-unfriendly infrastructure in projects such as the Vall 
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d’Hebron, has been seen by many as contradicting a central principle of Barcelona’s pre-
Games planning ideology. In contrast to schemes such as the Eixample, which aspired to 
social cohesion, projects like the Olympic Village have worsened gentrification in many 
parts of the city.  
In Athens, the immediate infrastructural legacy is one of abandonment, which 
stands in contrast to Barcelona. Athens’ lack of solid planning history, as well as its 
dispersed scheme for Olympic infrastructure, is partially to blame. Political animosities 
have also contributed to the city’s inability to effectively maintain its Olympic venues in 
the post-Games era. Fragmented schemes during the Olympic planning process were 
matched by mismanagement after the Games ended. This was the case with the Olympic 
Village, which today is plagued by unemployment. While Barcelona’s Olympic Village’s 
legacy is one of gentrification, Athens’ is one of neglect. 
Those venues which have found uses have followed the lead of pre-Games 
planning ideology and are utilized within the service sector of the economy. Sports arenas 
and press centers have been reopened as theaters and malls. In this way, the legacies of 
Barcelona and Athens are similar. Infrastructure projects, which were planned in the 
framework of the service economy, have fallen increasingly under the sway of private 
agents using the venues for alternate service-related purposes.  
 
The long-term effects of Olympic-era planning in Barcelona involve the 
increasing influence of private investors and the commodification of the city. City 
planning in the decades following the Games expanded on the marketing of Barcelona’s 
culture for the service economy, ultimately transforming the city into an object of 
 80 
consumption itself. This is best exemplified in the Forum 2004 project, which sought to 
follow the Olympic Village’s model of redeveloping the waterfront. However, the 
convention center and plaza built for the Forum related to the city to an even lesser extent 
than did the Olympic Village, and today stand essentially vacant. The Forum represents 
Barcelona’s full embrace of the service economy, clearly to the detriment of the city and 
its people. 
Recent city plans such as 22@, which seek to transform Barcelona’s industrial 
lands into new tech centers and lofts for young professionals, bear little resemblance to 
socially-oriented schemes like the Eixample. City planning in Barcelona following the 
Olympics has become wholly focused on the attraction of mobile capital through the 
development of service-related infrastructure, all but turning away from those who 
actually inhabit the city. 
For Athens, long-term planning legacy centers on the increasing economic and 
social fragmentation of the city. Publicly driven plans have largely failed due to the 
dispersed nature of such infrastructural interventions. At the same time, self-generated 
economic nodes have sprung up in the city. These nodes, like the public initiatives in 
Athens as well as those in Barcelona, have centered on the service sector. Also similar to 
Barcelona, these nodes have repurposed disused industrial land for culture- and leisure-
related activities. The success of these privately driven sites stands in direct contrast to 
the abandonment of facilities built by the city. 
The Athens Games have shown the true power of private forces in the present-day 
economic development of cities. The Games also illustrate the relative successes of 
redeveloping brownfield sites. The Barcelona Olympics demonstrate this as well, 
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indicating that this may be a potential factor in the effective development of service-
based infrastructure. 
 
Theoretical Framework: Saskia Sassen 
In her work, Saskia Sassen discusses the effects that recent processes of 
globalization have had on cities. Sassen’s analysis involves shifts in both economic 
patterns and the role of infrastructure in global cities. Her analysis is useful in 
understanding why the Olympics have changed over time and helps to explain the 
importance of city branding in the contemporary world. 
Sassen characterizes the current economic structure of cities as being the result of 
two intersecting processes. One is the “globalization of economic activity” and the 
increasing scale and complexity of international transactions.207 The other is the growing 
influence of the service sector economy and the increasing orientation of all economic 
industries toward services.208 These trends have contributed to a new economic structure 
in cities focused on the service economy. Sassen notes that services are enticing to cities 
because they can provide enormous profits that manufacturing and the industrial 
economy cannot.209 
This is consistent with the analysis of both Barcelona and Athens. In the case of 
Barcelona, city planning ideology centered on publicly driven, small-scale initiatives was 
transformed by the Olympics into a philosophy based on the attraction of global private 
capital. Projects such as the Forum represent a post-Games planning strategy linked to 
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services and founded on the notion that Barcelona must compete with other urban centers 
for capital investment.  
In the case of Athens, whose Olympics were held twelve years after Barcelona’s, 
the pursuit of mobile capital was a well-established tenet of Olympic planning. However, 
the legacy of Athens is marked by a failed attempt to repeat the alleged successes of 
Barcelona. Observing the growth of Barcelona’s service sector industries following the 
1992 Games, Athens aimed its Olympic planning strategies at the improvement of 
infrastructure suited to the service sector, specifically the culture and leisure economy. 
These plans were thwarted by the city’s scattered planning model and inability to 
maintain facilities after the Games. Yet in the wake of this letdown, privately driven 
economic nodes in the city emerged. Like the publicly planned initiatives for the 
Olympics had hoped to do, these nodes grew based on investment in service sector 
activities, such as arts and technology. 
It is clear that much of the planning and legacy for both the 1992 and 2004 Games 
can be understood through the lens of Sassen’s two intersecting processes. The increase 
in the sheer scale of global economic activities, as well as the turn toward investment in 
service sector industries, heavily influenced to the strategies for both the Barcelona and 
Athens Olympics. With this perspective, the Barcelona Games may be seen as a sort of 
experiment in using the Olympics to attract private investment, and the Athens Games as 
a botched attempt to repeat it. In Athens’ case, however, the private sector was able to 
succeed where the public sector failed. 
This concept of using the Olympics to attract capital investment can be further 
illuminated by Sassen’s work. Sassen locates the beginning of recent shifts in the world 
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economy in the 1980s, when “the geography and composition of the global economy 
changed so as to produce a complex duality: a spatially dispersed, yet globally integrated 
organization of economic activity.”210 The reorganization of the financial industry during 
that decade resulted in the proliferation of new firms and higher levels of innovation in 
the field.211 New technologies that allowed for the increased mobility of capital supported 
this expansion in the financial industry, as well as the entire service sector of the 
economy. However, while capital mobility encouraged spatial dispersion, the 
technologies that supported such mobility required physical infrastructure tied to specific 
geographic locations.212 
For the 1992 Olympics, Barcelona was able to rely on its history of strong urban 
planning strategies, using the Games as the vehicle by which to develop infrastructure 
and thus access the new service economy. The Barcelona Games demonstrate the link 
between infrastructure and capital that Sassen describes, and the economic growth of the 
city following the Olympics lends support to Sassen’s theory. The Athens Games, 
however, did not generate the same degree of growth as the Barcelona Olympics. This is 
in part due to both the city’s inability to rely on a strong planning history and the 
dispersed infrastructural scheme it developed for the Games. But while Athens’ public 
initiatives largely failed, privately driven, service-based economic nodes have grown and 
thrived in the city since the Games. These nodes, in accordance with Sassen’s theory, 
have relied on the creation of service-based infrastructure, including the redevelopment 
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of industrial sites. The Athens Games suggest that the role of infrastructure development, 
previously assigned to the public sector, has shifted to the private realm. 
The 1992 Olympics forged a new model for city planning in the era of the service 
economy. By reconciling the dispersive and centralizing features of mobile capital, the 
1992 Games forwarded a new mode of urban planning and development, using the 
Olympics as a vehicle to attract initial investment. The 2004 Games sought to emulate 
this model, but without the standard of infrastructure planning of the Barcelona 
Olympics, such an endeavor failed, resulting in the increasing spatial and social 
fragmentation of the city. In the wake of this failure, however, privately driven economic 
nodes have grown, indicating a shift in the responsibility for infrastructure 
development—and ultimately city planning processes—from the public to the private 
sector. 
 
Rio 2016 and the Future of Olympic Planning 
 The 2016 Olympics, hosted by Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, so far have seemed to 
follow the trend laid out by the Barcelona and Athens Games: heavy investment in 
infrastructure aimed at attracting service-related capital. Though both Barcelona and 
Athens drew much of their funding for Olympic infrastructure from public sources, the 
aftermath of the Athens Games indicated the rising power of private forces in urban 
economic development. Rio, more than either Barcelona or Athens, has embraced the 
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private sector as a source from which to draw money. According to mayor Eduardo Paes, 
approximately 60% of costs for the Games have come from private funding.213 
 Rio is also, to some extent, following the model of brownfield redevelopment. A 
new light rail line in the city runs along a street through a district of old warehouses, 
some of which are in the process of renovation. The city’s vision for the thoroughfare is 
an upscale promenade.214 Private investors have also funded projects such as the Olympic 
Village, the Olympic golf course, and a new waterfront with two museums. The Meu 
Porto Maravilha project, as many in Barcelona, involves the redevelopment of the 
waterfront from an industrial landscape to one populated by apartments. Developers have 
indicated that these apartments will be accessible to low-income families, but as was seen 
in Barcelona and Athens, these types of plans do not always unfold accordingly.215 In 
many ways, the planning ideology present in Rio aligns with that of Barcelona and 
Athens, intending to develop infrastructure suited to the attraction of service-related 
industries. 
 Given that not even a full year has passed since the conclusion of the Games, 
Rio’s Olympic legacy is still in flux. Thus far, it appears to be similar to the legacy of 
Athens, with many of the venues built for the Games already abandoned and in disrepair. 
The Olympic Park, though open to the public, is lacking in basic facilities such as 
restrooms. The Olympic Village, intended to be repurposed as luxury apartments, has 
sold fewer than 10% of its units. Commentators such as Renato Cosentino identify the 
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bulk of investment as being in projects located in the wealthy suburbs of Rio. These 
initiatives, he believes, were undertaken to serve private developers, not the city’s 
residents.216 It is clear that, at the very least, this capital-focused mentality that was 
evident in both the Barcelona and Athens Games endures in Rio.  
So what is the future of the Olympics? Andrew Ross Sorkin asks, “What is it 
about the Olympics that causes some cities that are typically unwilling to spend a cent on 
infrastructure or planning to overspend so wildly?”217 The answer is, at least in part, that 
the Olympics represent a vehicle for entry into the new service economy described by 
Sassen and that, when combined with strategic infrastructural interventions, have the 
potential to provide a huge economic boost for a city. Neither infrastructure nor the 
Olympics alone can accomplish this. The two need to work in tandem. 
This is good evidence that, for at least the near future, the current Olympic model 
will remain. Criticisms that center on the economic inefficiencies of the Olympics must 
also recognize that the Games represent a means by which to enter the global economy. If 
a city is willing to look outward rather than inward, if a city is willing to fully embrace 
the service economy, and importantly, if a city is capable of producing a cohesive 
infrastructure strategy, then the Olympics can bring a huge degree of capital investment. 
In many ways, Barcelona has achieved this. 
Of course, this is not to label such an achievement as praiseworthy. Because with 
this access to the global economy comes gentrification, social inequalities, and ultimately 
the commodification of the city. Barcelona’s Forum project stands as an example of 
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precisely this. Furthermore, those Olympic cities whose public initiatives fall short are 
left with urban incoherence and the economic burdens of their losses.  
Yet the lure of the global service economy and its promise of capital investment 
remain, and in the wake of public failures spring up privately generated nodes of 
economic activity and new infrastructure which, too, are oriented toward the service 
sector. This is epitomized in Athens. 
It is also worth noting that Olympic cities share many similarities with all global 
cities. All cities compete economically on the world stage, and so planning processes in 
Olympic cities should not necessarily be considered as special cases. The Olympics, as a 
sports mega-event, exist as a vehicle for entry into the new economy. But there are other 
vehicles in other forms. Across the world, urban planning strategies have embraced the 
service economy. Cities, understanding the need to compete with other cities for 
economic resources, have begun to look outward for investment rather than inward 
toward their own inhabitants. Planning strategies now view the city more as an economic 
growth machine than as a place where people actually live. It is these trends in planning 
ideology, themselves responses to changes in the world economy, that act as the driving 
forces behind the Olympic model. The Olympics, as colossal and transformative as they 
are, must be understood as just one small symptom of a much larger phenomenon.  
As goes the global economy, so go the Olympics. 
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